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Abstract
A jury in a criminal trial typically must make a decision about the guilt of a given
defendant. Occasionally, the jury moves one step beyond this basic task and chooses to
exercise its nullification power. That is, the jury decides that, according to the evidence,
a given defendant is guilty of the crime with which he or she is charged, but that applying
the law to that defendant would, essentially, not be doing justice.
While much is known about the process by which juries make decisions, the
specific factors that encourage juries to engage in nullification and the circumstances
under which they will elect to do so are, in some sense, a mystery. However, we cannot
hope to understand when, why or how a jury may choose nullification without first
understanding the history behind jury nullification and how it works or should work in
practice. One way to gain such an understanding is to contrast the view of nullification
advanced by its advocates, like the Fully Informed Jury Association, with the view of
nullification adopted by the modem criminal justice system.
In 1995, in Fully Informed Jury Association v. County of San Diego the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals held that California had a compelling state interest in preventing FIJA
from place newsletters in a newsstand within 50 yards of the San Diego County
Courthouse. This case exemplifies the idea that the courts tend to cast the practice of jury
nullification in terms of "juror lawlessness".

However, the courts' view of jury

nullification is misguided. While states likely have an interest in limiting instances of
nullification, this interest cannot be characterized as compelling where jury nullification
is properly understood.
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. Chapter 1- Introduction
In the American legal system, the jury is generally regarded as a sort of bulwark
that seeks to ensure that the government does not overexert its authority to unnecessarily
persecute the individual being prosecuted for a crime. Generally, a jury in a criminal trial
must make a decision about the guilt of a given defendant. Occasionaily, the jury moves
one step beyond this basic task and chooses to exercise its nullification power. That is,
the jury decides that, according to the evidence, a given defendant is guilty of the crime
with which he or she is charged, but that applying the law to that defendant would, in
essence, not be doing justice. In instances of nullification, the jury is either making a
statement about a social issue that reaches beyond a particular trial or finds applying the
law in that particular instance offensive to its collective sense of morality. The
resurgence of this phenomenon during the past two decades can be attributed, in part, to
the activities of public interest groups, to the introduction of legislation into the
legislatures of at least seven states requiring judges to present nullification as an option
when giving instructions to the jury, and to the attention generated by the media when it
has been suggested that jury nullification has occurred in high-profile cases, such as those
involving O.J. Simpson or Dr. Jack Kevorkian.
While much is known about the process by which juries make decisions, the
specific factors that encourage juries to engage in nullification and the circumstances
under which they will elect to do so are, in some sense, a mystery. However, there is no
hope of understanding when, why, or how a jury may choose nullification without first
articulating a practical, proper definition of jury nullification and determining a
1

framework for how it should work in practice. An analysis of these considerations
should offer some measure as to· whether jury nullification is an artifact unfit for modem
criminal justice or whether it may have still have some practical applications.
The debate surrounding jury nullification is not centered on the question of
whether jurors can engage in nullification when reaching a verdict in a given trial but
instead whether jurors should, under any circumstances, engage in nullification. Related
to this question is whether jurors should be informed that nullification is an option and, if
so, should trial judges be obligated to include this information in their instructions when
charging the jury. This thesis does not attempt to elaborate the merits or disadvantages of
informing jurors of their nullification power. Rather, this thesis has two separate but
related objectives. The first objective is to trace the development of the doctrine of jury
�ullification in order to present a definition of nullification that is both consistent with the
doctrine's history and is normatively justifiable in terms of justice and civil disobedience.
�econdly, this thesis examines the activities of the Fully Informed Jury Association and
argues that, while this group has an important message, its practices prevent it from being
taken seriously, making some reforms necessary.
Historically, jury nullification represents an important facet of the criminal justice
system, but since it is rarely publicized it is extremely likely that jurors do not know that
nullification is among the options available for consideration by juries. For this reason,
some public interest groups, like the Fully Informed Jury Association, attempt to educate
potential jurors about their power to opt for nullification. The Fully Informed Jury
Association (FUA) has attempted to inform potential jurors of this power through a
2

variety of means, including picketing outside of courthouses, approaching potential
jurors, leafletirig, and distributing newsletters.

While FIJA seemingly has good

intentions, it also has several intrinsic flaws. Among its problems are the advocacy of an
incorrect and inconsistent definition of jury nullification, a disconnect between the laws
the organization actually opposes and the laws violated in cases in which they encourage
nullification, a failure to coordinate activities and objectives between the national board
and state offices, and a failure to articulate the instances in which jury nullification would
be both appropriate and justifiable.
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fully Informed Jury Association v.
County of San Diego held that California had a compelling state interest in preventing

FIJA from place newsletters in a newsstand within 50 yards of the San Diego County
Courthouse. This ruling is interesting, in part, because of the activities in which members
of FIJA where not engaged. Members of FIJA were not picketing outside the courthouse;
they were not harassing potential jurors; they were not mounting a rowdy protest; they
were not attempting to incite a riot; they were not causing a disturbance inside the
courthouse itself. Rather, they were engaging in an activity normally protected by the
First Amendment.
Fully Informed Jury Association ·v. County of San Diego exemplifies the idea that

the courts tend to cast the practice of jury nullification in terms of "juror lawlessness".
This is not surprising nor should the courts be expected to define jury nullification in any
other way. However, the courts' view of jury nullification is misguided. Neither in
history nor in practice has nullification been synonymous ·with lawlessness.

Juror
3

J�wle�sness suggests that jurors are disregarding the applicable law in a given case absent
any sort of ration�e. By tracing the doctrine's history, examining how it works in
practice, analyzing the rationale of those opposed to jury nullification, and considering
possible normative justifications, it becomes clear that jury nullification has moral and
ethical underpinnings. Further, it may be that instances of nullification can be regarded
as expressions of the jury's, and thereby the community's, collective sense of justice. If
this is the case, then the ruling in Fully Informed Jury Association v. County of San Diego
is turned on its head. While states arguably have an interest in limiting instances of jury
nullification, this interest cannot be characterized as compelling where jury nullification
is properly understood.
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Chapter 2- Jury Nullification: A History and Evolution

Introduction
Embodied in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is the right
of every defendant in a criminal proceeding to be tried by a jury of his or her peers. In a
sense, the jury lends a certain amount of legitimacy to criminal proceedings. Juries are
intended to represent a cross-section of the community, so a jury verdict carries with it a
certain expression of community standards with regard to the offense with which the
defendant is charged. Aside from serving as an outlet for the articulation of community
standards, the jury performs two other important functions. First, the jury is often
regarded as a procedural safeguard against arbitrary governmental action. Arbitrary
action on the part of the government could take many forms, ranging from overzealous
prosecutors to the persecution of members of an unpopular minority. The jury, however,
is always supposed to be impartial when deciding upon a verdict. In this way, the jury
can protect a defendant who has been wrongly accused. Secondly, the jury is to act as the
finder of fact., This implies that the jury is to weigh the evidence and then determine
whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof as defined by the law. Given that
juries are composed of laypeople rather than legal experts, their understanding of the law
in a particular case is dependent upon explanations by the trial judge.
While this view of the role of the jury is widely accepted, this acceptance is not
universal. Critics of this view contend that juries are supposed to decide matters of fact
and law. This perspective is particularly controversial because it suggests that juries are
free to disregard the trial judge's instructions on what a particular law says, how the
5

evidence presented may or may not support the conditions of that law, and how that law
relates to a given defendant.

Some argue, in part, that a jury that disregards the

instructions of the trial judge is reaching verdict not based on the law but based on some
other arbitrary and indefinable standard. When a jury reaches a verdict in this way, it is
said to be engaging in jury nullification. This certainly sounds like a bad idea. However,
it may be that jury nullification cannot be defined in such simple terms. Further, it may
be that jury nullification is not a perversion of the role of the jury, but is instead only a
different way of considering the importance of the jury to the criminal justice system.
Understanding the far-reaching implications of this perspective requires a review of the
evolution of the jury from its earliest days to its role in the criminal justice system in
modern America.

The Common Law Jury and Jury Nullification
Like.much of American criminal law, the use of juries in criminal trials has its
roots in English common law. Prior to the 11th century, any person accused of a crime
was subjected to trial by ordeal. Trial by ordeal assumed that if the defendant was
innocent, God would intervene on his behalf. However, in 1215, Pope Innocent II
abolished the use of ordeals in criminal trials, claiming that it was barbaric. This created
a dilemma for the medieval criminal justice system. Since verdicts in criminal cases had
always turned on an interpretation of the will of God, there were no other formal
procedures for assessing a defendant's guilt or innocence.

This problem was

compounded by the fact that capital punishment was almost always the penalty for being
6

found guilty of· any crime. After the abolition of trial by ordeal, judges were both
reluctant and ilf equipped to decide criminal cases. Further, there were no procedures for
gathering evidence or procuring eyewitness testimony. Juries seemed a logical solution
to these problems and became a necessary convenience in the administration of justice.
Early juries were composed of men who were chosen to participate in a trial for
their knowledge of the defendant and of the facts surrounding the case. Intuitively, where
there were gaps in the jurors' knowledge of either the defendant or the facts of the case, a
verdict was reached on the basis of common sense. However, there were at least two
problems with the jury system evident from its inception. First, jurors were in almost
constant peril of being punished for their verdicts. If the court disagreed with a jury's
verdict, jurors could be tried for perjury, their property could be confiscated, or they
could be imprisoned for some indefinite period. Additionally, it was not unusual for
courts to pressure a jury to change its verdict by imprisoning its members without food
and water or by imposing hefty fines. Secondly, the law defined only broad categories of
crimes. For �xample, the law did not recognize a distinction between premeditated
murder and m�rder that is committed in self-defense. Moreover, even after the courts
shifted from trial by ordeal to trial by jury, the penalty for being found guilty of any
crime remained the same. Guilty defendants were sentenced to death, whether their
crime was murder, treason, theft, or something less.
Much like modem juries, early juries were initially conceptualized by criminal
courts as being the finders of fact. Early trial judges instructed the jury as to matters of
law.

However, the sentiment of early juries that capital punishment was not an
7

appropriate penalty for every crime led them to acquit many defendants, except those
who were guilty of particularly heinous crimes. Juries in the 14th century were the first to
make a distinction between "murder" and what today is regarded as "manslaughter".
They voiced this distinction by acquitting defendants when there were mitigating
circumstances surrounding the crime; for example, a killing that was the result of self
defense (Green 1985, 33). This distinction was ultimately codified, in part, to raise the
conviction rate. Further, juries were also likely to refuse to convict in cases where the
defendant was charged with theft. In this way, they seemed to be sending a message that,
while the community did not condone stealing, it felt that capital punishment was an
inappropriate penalty (Green 1985, 63).

It is important to note that by acquitting

defendants under these circumstances, early juries were making decisions on matters of
law, by deciding that the law was in some way inappropriate as applied to a particular
defendant. That is, by acquitting certain defendants who were guilty according to the
letter of the law, early juries were engaging in jury nullification.
One of the best-documented instances of early jury nullification is the trial of
William Penn and William Mead in 1670.

Penn and Mead were both Quakers, a

religious group that was highly unpopular and, thus, oppressed by the government. As a
move to hinder the Quakers from holding Sunday meetings, authorities padlocked the
door to their meetinghouse on Grace Street in London. Finding they unable to get inside
the building, Penn and Mead delivered a sermon to a crowd of several hundred in the
middle of the street. Both were swiftly arrested and charged with two felonies- unlawful
assembly and disturbing the peace. Again, any felony was considered a capital offense.
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At their trial, Penn appealed to the jury. After pleading guilty to both counts, Penn
•[¼;,

argued in open court that the charge against him was illegal. Essentially, he claimed that,
while the law may have been legal, its application, with respect to himself and Mead, was
unjust. Penn asked the jury to disregard the law and return a verdict according to its
conscience; the judge, of course, stressed in his instruction that the jury was only to
consider the facts and determine whether Penn and Mead were guilty of violating the
letter of the law. From the court's perspective, the proper verdict should have been fairly
obvious given that both men had made admissions of guilt.
After deliberating for only a short time, the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty"
for Mead and only found Penn guilty of speaking in public, a lesser charge. The judge
was displeased and sent the jury back out to deliberate further. When the jury returned to
the courtroom a second time, its verdict still had not changed. Growing frustrated, the
judge imprisoned all twelve jurors and instructed that they should not be given anything
to eat or drink until such time as they were willing to return a verdict acceptable to the
court. After i�prisonment and further deliberation, the jury returned "not guilty" verdicts
for both Penn �nd Mead.
Realizing that the jury was not going to return a " guilty" verdict for either Penn or
Mead (which records indicate was the only verdict the court was willing to accept), the
judge levied heave fines against Penn, Mead, and all the jurors. Additionally, all were
imprisoned until the fines were paid. Penn, Mead, and eight of the jurors paid their fines.
The remaining four jurors remained in prison for several months, ultimately suing for
their release in the Court of Common Pleas.
9

The American Jury and Jury Nullification
For colonists still under the rule of the British crown, jury nullification assumed a
slightly different form. While it seems that juries in England engaged in nullification
because they perceived inconsistencies between the severity of certain crimes and the
severity of the penalty for being found guilty of those crimes, colonial juries engaged in
jury nullification as a form of protest against a campaign to silence those critical of the
government.
Enforcing laws against seditious libel became one convenient means for the
government to silence its critics. Seditious libel, which is defined as criticism of the
government or any public official, became a target for jury nullification.

This is

exemplified by the trial of John Peter Zenger.
A group of wealthy colonists in New York were interested in resisting Governor
William Cosby's administration. They hired Zenger to publish a weekly newsletter as a
tool for accomplishing this resistance. Zenger began publishing the New York Weekly
Journal, which carried articles authored by colonists that were sharply critical of Cosby

and his policies. In 1734, Zenger was arrested and charged with "printing and publishing
seditious libel" (Dwyer 2002, 64). At his trial, Zenger's lawyer began by arguing that the
question for the jury to consider was not whether Zenger had published the articles in
question (this was indisputable) but whether the contents of the articles was actually
libelous. The judge reminded Zenger's lawyer that truth was not a defense against
charges of seditious libel, so Zenger's lawyer appealed to the jury on another level. He
argued that the jury has a right to determine both matters of law and of fact. Again, the
10

judge corrected the lawyer, claiming that the court recognized the jury's role as limited to
•··

determining only matters of fact. However, the jury was persuaded by this argument and
ultimately acquitted Zenger.
Following the trial, commercial printers published transcripts of the trial, with
emphasis on the arguments made by Zenger's lawyer, and made them available
throughout the colonies. As juries continued to acquit defendants, seditious libel became
dead law. Dwyer (2002) and others have argued that events like this paved the way for
the First Amendment.
Jury nullification continued to gain acceptance in America until the late 1800s. It
was widely understood that a jury could interpret both the facts and the law in a given
case. In fact, jurors were regularly instructed that they could render verdicts on the basis
of conscience. However, industrialization, the post-Civil War climate, and an increase in
the number of lawyers led to a demand for greater certainty in the law. There came to be
a great deal of inconsistency in terms of the acceptance of jury nullification. In some
courtrooms, ju�ors were told that verdicts according to conscience were permissible. In·
other courtroo�s, however, jurors were directed to consider only the facts in light of the
trial judge's instructions on the law. Ultimately, the antinullification view carried the
day, culminating in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sparfv. United States.

The Supreme Court and the Role of the Juror
In general, the Supreme Court has been largely silent on the issue of jury
nullification. Perhaps this is not unexpected. When the Court has spoken, it has been to
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encourage adherence to the rule of law and caution jurors to follow the instructions of the
trial judge. The Court's view of the role of the juror with respect to nullification was
detailed most clearly in Sparfv. United States (156 U.S. 51, 1895).
Sparf was one of three sailors accused of murdering a fellow crewmember while
on a voyage to Tahiti. He was tried along with one other sailor, Hansen. At their trial,
the defendants requested that the jury be given a specific set of instructions, among them
that the jury could choose to find them guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. The
trial court refused all of the defense's suggested jury instructions. In the end, Sparf and
Hansen were found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court heard
the appeal on a writ of error.
In Spar!, the Court is asked to consider two questions, one specific and one
general. First, the Court is asked to determine whether the lower court abused its
authority by failing to instruct the jury that, though Sparf and Hansen were charged with
murder, it could regard manslaughter as a lesser-included offense. This implies that the
jury could have then chosen to convict one or both men of manslaughter rather than
murder.

However, the Court found that the trial court had not erred in its jury

instructions because all the evidence clearly supported an indictment for murder against
he two sailors. The evidence could not reasonably be construed in a more favorable way
so as to allow Sparf and Hansen to be convicted only of manslaughter.
After dismissing the first question with little discussion, the Court develops an
answer to the second, more general question in much more detail. The second question
presented in Sparf is whether the jury is required to accept the trial judge's interpretation
12

of the law as binding. That is, whether the jury is free to interpret the law for itself or
whether the jury must regard the trial judge's explanation of the law as controlling and
limit its role to an analysis of the facts of a given case. The Court never answers this
question directly. Instead, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, concludes that juries
have the power but not the right to engage in nullification (St. John 1997, 2563).
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Harlan cites as evidence the way the role of
the jury is perceived in state courts as well as common law precedents, like Bushel 's
Case. Rather than finding Bushel 's Case or other common law precedents as supportive

of jury nullification, however, Harlan emphasizes the absence of a law expressly
designating the jury as the sole interpreter of the law in a given case. Harlan continues by
noting a variety of problems that might arise were the jury given a right to interpret the
law for itself. For example, Harlan argues that there would be a lack of consistency in
the administration of criminal law, that the appeals process would be frustrated, public an
private safety would be compromised, and that the continued existence of the court
system would be threatened.
.

.

In its ruling, the Court does not expressly forbid juries from interpreting the law
for themselves; however, it urges jurors to accept the trial judge's interpretation of the
law as legitimate and correct. If juries refuse to do this, it is argued, then only popular
laws will be enforced. Often, unpopular laws are not necessarily unjust laws. Allowing
juries to interpret the law would allow for a great many inconsistencies in the
administration of justice and would prevent the courts from protecting the ·rights of
individuals. Implicit in this idea is that any juror who might feel compelled to disregard
13

the trial judge's instructions on the law in favor of his or her own interpretation is being
careless at best. While that juror may feel that a verdict according to the conscience is in
the best interest of the defendant, allowing juries to vote on the basis of conscience rather
than the law is in the worst interest of society as a whole. Harlan concludes that when a
jury votes according its conscience rather than the law, it is encouraging the development
of a government of men rather than a government of laws (Sparf , 103).

Jury Nullification and the States
The federal courts have not embraced jury nullification. Beginning with Sparf
and persisting in more recent cases, like United States v. Thomas (Nos. 95-1337 et al,
1997, 2d.Cir.), federal courts have maintained that juries should limit their deliberations
to weig_hing the facts of a given case rather than constructing their own interpretations of
the law. States, on the other hand, have been generally more willing to give jurors
greater latitude in figuring out the law for themselves. Three states (Georgia, Maryland,
and Indiana) have "jury determination" amendments to their state constitutions that
require trial judges, when charging a jury, to present nullification as one option that the
jury may consider when reaching a verdict. Examining the way this type of jury
instruction works in practice provides a useful contrast between the acceptanc_e of jury
nullification at in state and federal courts.
To be clear, federal courts have long held that juries have the power but not the
right the engage in nullification. The striking difference between this perspective and the
perspective embodied in the constitutions of Georgia, Maryland, and Indiana is that jury
14

nullification is 'elevated to the status of a right in these states (St. John 1997, 2569).
While juries are free to choose nullification in the absence of a constitutional amendment
or any sort of positive instruction from the trial judge, jury determination amendments are
important not because they give jurors power that they would not have otherwise but
because they inform jurors that nullification is an alternative to applying the law. Given
that nullification is rarely publicized, it is extremely likely that the average juror is
unaware that he or she need not accept and act upon the court's interpretation of the law.
That courts are required to inform jurors of this alternative is noteworthy.
While nullification is recognized, at least in these three states, as a right possessed
by juries, it is not an absolute right. State courts have interpreted jury determination
amendments in such a way as to place restrictions on what might appear to be absolute
jury power.

Georgia courts have given the most · narrow reading to this type of

amendment. The Georgia constitution holds, in part, that "the jury shall be the judges of
the law and the facts" (Art. I, Sec. 1). When this provision was adopted as part of the
state's first constitution in 1777 (Art. XLI), it may have seemed that Georgia juries would
be given great latitude to interpret the law for themselves. This sentiment was also
embodied in the 1833 Penal Code (St. John 1997, 2569).
However, Georgia courts moved quickly to interpret the amendment in a way that
did not allow juries such leeway. The 1880 decision in Hill v. State (64 Ga. 453) still
defines jury power. Hill was on trial for murdering a man whom he believed was
somehow romantically involved with his wife. The trial judge was concerned that the
jury might excuse the murder, in part because Hill argued that he acted out of a desire to
15

protect his wife. When instructing the jury, the judge noted that state law would allow
for an acquittal only if the evidence supported the suggestion that Hill' s wife was facing
imminent physical harm when Hill committed the murder. Further, the judge noted that
while the jury was free to interpret "the law and the facts" for themselves, they should
recognize that "the law is not wrong" (St. John 1997, 2568). Implicit in this instruction
was the idea that the jury should feel obligated to convict Hill of murder, if they found
the evidence did not support the suggestion that Hill acted to protect his wife from
immediate harm. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court found that the trial judge had
not erred in his instruction, concluding that the Georgia constitution did not provide
jurors with any real power to interpret the law (St. John 1 997, 2567-68).
Later courts noted that the decision in Hill offered an interpretation of the
amendment that seemed contrary to the literal meaning of the amendment, but concluded,
absent any analysis, that the Hill court was correct in its decision. Hill has never been
overruled nor has the amendment ever been given an interpretation broader than that
expressed in 1880.
In a provision not unlike Georgia' s, Article 23 of the Maryland constitution
provides that, "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as
well as fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a conviction." Throughout the 1800s, Maryland juries were given broad authority
to interpret the law independent of the trial judges' instructions largely because the
Maryland constitution did little to distinguish between the role of the judge and the role
of the jury. For example, jurors were permitted to make the types of decisions typically
16

left to judges, like interpreting a law so as to determine whether it was intended to apply
to the particular act with which a defendant was charged (St. John 1997, 2570).
However, the scope of Article 23 has been systematically diminished through a series of
judicial decisions, rendering the provision little more than an artifact.
When presented with opportunities to interpret Article 23, judges began by
construing the role of the jury in a more limited way, prohibiting juries from declaring
statutes unconstitutional, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, or rendering verdicts
that could serve as precedents. Judges were given the opportunity to limit the jury's role
even further when, in the late 1940s, criminal defendants began to challenge Article 23 as
a violation of their equal protection and due process rights (373 U.S. 83, 1963). The end
of seemingly unbridled jury power came with the 1980 decision in Stevenson v. State
(423 A.2d. 558), in which the Maryland Court of Appeals overruled the longstanding
doctrine permitting criminal juries to regard the instructions of the trial judge as merely
advisory.
The last vestige of the jury's power to act on interpretations of the law that differ
from that given by the trial judge is embodied in Rule 4-325, which allows attorneys to
argue for interpretations of the law that differ from that offered by the trial judge. This
practice does little to undermine the trial judges' authority. First, the trial judge must
determine whether there is any basis for an attorney to argue for a different interpretation
of the law. Secondly, the judge may dissent from the attorney's argument in the form of
an advisory instruction to the jury (Scheflin and Van Dyke 1980, 84).
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While courts in G�orgia and Maryland have cast the role of the jury in such a way
that it can hardly be said that the constitution of either state actually favors nullification,
the jury determination amendment of the Indiana constitution has been given a
consistently broad, though sometimes contradictory, reading by state courts. The Indiana
constitution provides that, "in all criminal cases, whatever, the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts" (Art. I, Sec. 19). As in Georgia and Maryland, Indiana
courts have noted that the jury is not concerned with the constitutionality of a law, only
its application. This means that juries cannot declare statues unconstitutional, define or
create crimes, or render a verdict that will be regarded as precedent.
The trend toward giving Section 19 a broad reading began in 1857 with Lynch v.
State (9 Ind. 541 , 1857). Here, the court held that the trial judge's instructions were

meant to "inform the jurors' judgments not bind their consciences" (St. John 1997, 2572).
The rule emerging from Lynch was curbed, though only · slightly, in 1899 with
Bridgewater v. State (55 N.E. 737, 1899). In Bridgewater,' the Indiana Supreme Court

ruled that, while trial judges must instruct jurors that they were the judges of "both the
law and the facts", trial judges were not required to give any further explanation as to the
jury's role. This meant the trial judge was not required to explicitly characterize his
instructions as "advisory" when charging the jury.
As recently as 1967, the Indiana Supreme Court held that Section 19 "means
exactly what it says" (Holliday v. State, 254 Ind. 85, 1967, as cited in Scheflin and,Van
Dyke 1980, 80). However, as trial judges continued to be frustrated with their inability to
given binding instructions to the jury, the typical jury instruction became contradictory.
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Now juries are told both that they can interpret the law for themselves and that they must
follow the trial judges instructions. More specifically, jurors are instructed that, while
free to determine the law for themselves, the court's interpretation of the law is the most
appropriate (St. John 1997, 2572-73).

Conclusion
Tracing the evolution of the jury and its role in the American criminal justice
system accomplishes two things. First, it provides some background for discussing the
purposes that the jury is intended to serve. Secondly, it shows that jury nullification is
not a new phenomenon nor is it something foreign to American criminal justice. That
jury nullification is a doctrine with deep roots that has persisted through the evolution of
the modern criminal jury suggests that there may be something worthwhile about
allowing juries to sit in judgment of the law.
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Chapter 3- A Proper Definition of Jury Nullification

Introduction
To date, a single, all-inclusive definition of jury nullification does not exist. This
may help explain why jury nullification is such a contentious and misunderstood subject.
To the extent that nullification is debated, these debates reflect a variety of perspectives,
often allowing their proponents, essentially, to talk past each other. Even where there is a
shared, general definition of jury nullification, the absence of a more specific definition
makes several things impossible. Namely, the lack of a clear definition makes it
impossible to determine the circumstances, if any, under which jury nullification is
appropriate or to predict when jury nullification may occur. Moreover, the lack of a clear
definition increases the difficulty of identifying instances of jury nullification. A clear
and complete definition of jury nullification accounts for the way jury nullification is
defined according to at least four perspectives- historical, practical, legal, and academic.

Jury Nullification in History and Practice: A Summary
Chapter 2 provides a framework for understanding the way jury nullification has
developed within the context of. the criminal jury trial and also discussed how jury
nullification occurs in state courts (i.e. in practice). In searching for a proper and
complete definition of jury nullification, it is necessary to account for both of these
perspectives as they serve as two major sources of empirical evidence regarding jury
nullification.
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Historically, jury nullification has been defined as permitting jurors to interpret
the law for themselves, either in the absence of or in spite of the trial judge's instructions
on the law.

Often, juries engaged in nullification as a form of protest against an

oppressive government, as exemplified by 2.enger's trial. In addition to being regarded
as form of protest, nullification was often considered an expression of the desires of the
community. Lawmakers were responsive to instances of nullification; for example, a
legal distinction was created between murder and manslaughter after juries continually
acquitted defendants charged with murder when there was some significant mitigating
factor, like self-defense. It is important to note that the presence of discernible patterns
of nullification suggests that jurors did not engage in nullification in some arbitrary or
haphazard manner. Rather, jurors were acting according to some standard. Typically,
historians argue that when jurors opted for nullification, it was an expression of the
community's conscience.
In order to understand how jury nullification works in practice in the context of
the modem criminal justice system, it is most common to look to the states that have
some sort of jury determination amendment in their state constitutions. While jurors in
Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland are still instructed to act as the finders of the facts and
the law, this broad instruction has been considerably narrowed through judicial
interpretation. What might have given jurors a wide range of authority judge the law has
been reduced to a relatively weak right. Missing from the state's approach to jury
nullification is the suggestion of some sort of standard by which jurors might judge the
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faw. _ Certainly, there must be some guidelines for nullification if its practice is to be
defended.

The Court's View of Jury Nullification: A Summary
Chapter 2 also outlines the position federal courts have assumed vis-a-vis jury
nullification. The courts have been largely silent on this issue, but when they have
spoken it has been to encourage jurors to adhere to the rule of law and follow the
instructions given by the trial judge. Typically, jury nullification is cast by the courts in
terms of "juror lawlessness". This is not surprising nor should the courts be expected to
define jury nullification in any other way. In Sparf v. Hansen, the Court asserts that
rampant jury nullification will lead to the enforcement of only popular laws and also to
the "government of men" with which the Founders were so concerned.

This

antinullification view has persisted in more recent cases like United States v. Thomas, in
which a federal judge dismissed a juror whom he suspected was encouraging the other
eleven jurors to engage in nullification.
However, the courts' view of jury nullification is misguided. Neither in history
nor in practice has jury nullification been synonymous with juror lawlessness. Juror
lawlessness suggests that jurors are disregarding the applicable law in a given case absent
any sort of rationale. By tracing the doctrine's history, it becomes clear that jury
nullification has moral and ethical underpinnings and that instances of nullification can
be regarded as expressions of the jury's collective sense of justice.
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Defining Jury Nullification: A Review of the Literature
The literature on jury nullification attempts to identify some set of standards or
guidelines under which jurors might engage in nullification. This is useful in terms of
crafting a workable and practical definition of jury nullification that recognizes a set of
circumstances within which its practice would be justifiable and appropriate. However,
the literature is largely silent in pointing out actual examples of nullification. This is to
be expected, however, given that there has yet to be an empirical study to identify those
cases in which nullification is a likely outcome. The purpose of examining the literature
on jury nullification, then, is not to identify specific instances of nullification but rather to
identify an appropriate definition that incorporates a set of nullification guidelines.
Not' everyone agrees that jury nullification is a good idea, meaning that some
scholars argue that nullification is never justifiable. In conducting a cost-benefit analysis
of nullification, Leipold argues that the costs of encouraging jurors to engage in
nullification outweigh any benefits that might be derived from such action. He defines
nullification as an acquittal based on the jury's sense of fairness or justice that occurs
"when a defendant's guilt is clear beyond a reasonable doubt" (1996, 253). · Further,
Leipold claims that when a jury engages in nullification, "it ignores the judge's legal
instructions and vetoes a legislative definition of culpable conduct" (1996, 254f Scheflin
and Van Dyke offer a similar definition of nullification. They note that "jurors have the
power to refuse to apply the law (or 'nullify') its effects in situations when the strict
application of the law would lead to an unjust or inequitable result" (1980, 54).
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St. John (1997) differs from both Leipold and Scheflin and Van Dyke in that he
defines jury nullification as, essentially, jury lawmaking. However, this definition cannot
be correct because it has several flaws. First, juries are not simply mini legislatures. A
jury is a cross-section of the community that is impaneled for the purpose of assessing the
guilt of a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

A legislature is an elected body of

representatives charged with the task of making public policy. The two are not the same
nor do their functions overlap. A single jury verdict can never be said to set policy for an
entire society in the same way as a single legislative act. The only way that a jury could
ever determine public policy would be if jury verdicts could serve as precedents. This
can never happen, bringing to bear an additional problem presented by St. John's
definition.

The suggestion that jury nullification is equivalent to lawmaking is

problematic because a single jury verdict cannot permanently alter the law in any way.
Further, a jury can never declare an amendment or statute unconstitutional.
That juries are not lawmaking entities, in contrast to St. John's suggestion, does
not conflict with the assertion that patterns of jury nullification can lead to changes in the
law. Historically, changes in the law have been brought about as legislatures responded
to instanc�� of jury nullification. By acquitting otherwise guilty defendants, juries likely
sounded the call that a change in the law was necessary, but seeing that change occurred
was dependent upon the actions of policymakers.
Butler (1995) offers perhaps the most comprehensive definition of jury
nullification. Butler says that jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits an otherwise
guilty defendant because the jury objects to the law the defendant is accused of violating
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or because the jury objects to the application of a particular law to a particular defendant.
When the jury engages in nullification, it is voting according to its conscience and
refusing to be constrained by the judge's instructions, the evidence, or the facts of the
case. While this is reminiscent of other definitions, like those offered by Leipold or
Scheflin and Van Dyke, Butler actually goes one step farther by offering a framework to
guide jurors considering in engaging in nullification.
Butler identifies three categories of crimes and argues that there are some
circumstances under which jurors should evaluate the evidence with a presumption in
favor of nullification (1995, 7 15). The first category identified by Butler is comprised of
violent malum in se crimes, which include murder, rape, or assault. When a defendant is
charged with this type of crime, Butler asserts, the jury should reach its verdict based
only on the evidence. Nonviolent malum in se crimes, like theft or perjury, comprise the
second category. When a defendant is charged with this type of crime, jurors should
consider nullification as one option but there should never be a presumption in favor of it.
The final category includes nonviolent malum prohibitum crimes, which are essentially
"victimless" crimes, like simple possession of drugs or prostitution. Here, Butler claims,
there should actually be a presumption in favor of nullification.
While this type of framework is useful in moving toward a definition of jury
nullification that would allow for the identification of cases where nullification would be
appropriate and justifiable, Butler's definition has one important limitation.

Butler

argues that African-American jurors should use this framework for jury nullification to
acquit a greater number of African-American defendants. He 'contends that the African-
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American community suffers from having too many of its young men incarcerated for
nonviolent crimes. By the force of this logic, the African-American community is better
off when some lawbreakers go free. The point here is that Butler does not intend for his
definition of or framework for nullification to be all-inclusive; rather, he is offering
nullification as an option to a specific groups of people to meet a specific set of ends.

A Proper Definition of Jury Nullification
A proper and practical definition of jury nullification reflects the doctrine' s
historic role in the American criminal justice system and offers a framework to guide
jurors considering nullification. Such a definition would help to ensure that nullification
does not become an arbitrary choice, resulting from confusion or misguided rebellion on
the part of the juror.

With this in mind, jury nullification occurs when a juror

purposefully rejects the trial judge' s interpretation of the law and votes to acquit a
defendant who, according to the evidence, is guilty because the juror finds the law under
which the defendant is charged somehow objectionabJe.
In order to offer a definition of jury nullification that is defensible, there must be a
standard to guide jurors who are considering nullification. One way to accomplish this is
to adopt a set of guidelines similar to those proposed by Butler. Toward that end, in
cases involving either violent malum in se crimes or nonviolent malum in se crimes,
jurors should consider the verdict based on the evidence and the trial judge' s
interpretation of the law alone. However, in cases involving malum prohibitum crimes,
there should be a presumption in favor of nullification when the juror seeks to protest a
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law or class of laws. The key here is that the jurors

are protesting · the law itself and not

just its application to a particular defendant. While justice may be a consequence of
nullification in this case, the true end for the jurors is protest by returning a verdict that
sends a message. Every time a jury nullifies, it highlights a defect in the current law
(Scheflin and Van Dyke 1980, 88). For example, a juror might feel compelled to protest
laws proscribing the use of medical marijuana by terminally ill patients or anti-sodomy
statutes by refusing to convict defendants charged under these laws. . When nullification
is regarded as an avenue to protest, it becomes a form of political speech.

Conclusion
This definition and subsequent framework reflects that notion that jury
nullification has historically been understood as a form of protest against an oppressive
government. Also, it is consistent with the suggestion that, in instances of nullification,
the jury is attempting to send a message with its verdict about some issue larger than the
instant case. Further, this definition offers some guidelines that seek to ensure that
nullification is not arbitrary and imply that not every law would be a target for
· nullification.

As Leipold notes, cases involving unpopular laws or government

misconduct are not typical fare in criminal court. Cases like these, however, are often
targets for nullification. This both minimizes the costs associated with nullification but
maximizes the amount of attention instances of nullification can attract.

Leipold

contends that instances of nullification are akin to meteors hitting the earth: spectacular
when they occur, but not common enough to cause undue concern (1996, 259).
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Chapter 4- A Normative Approach to Jury Nullification: Rawls and the Original
Position

Introduction
In one sense, the term "justice" is so abstract that it nearly defies definition. In
another sense, "justice" brings to mind notions of equality, morality, and ethics. · Most
simply, justice can be thought of as an attempt to differentiate between right and wrong.
However, this definition cannot be regarded as an end in itself; rather it is the questions
raised by such a definition that permit the concept of justice to serve as a useful heuristic
for evaluating social institutions. Further, it may be argued that since ideas about the
nature of justice likely differ from one society to the next and even one person to the
next, identifying an overarching conception of justice is as impossible as settling on its
singular definition.
This sort of claim is unacceptable. Justice has long been recognized as an
important goal for individuals, societies, and governments. Moreover, justice is touted as
one of the goals of the American legal system, and there are numerous provisions in place
to ensure the just treatment of individuals by the government. If one accepts the claim
'

'

that justice is to be a goal of government as a social institution, it stands to reason that
there is a way of thinking about this concept that moves beyond the abstract so as to
make justice a practical, viable goal . and outlines the manner by which justice may be
achieved. The idea is not to argue in favor of a definitive theory of justice, because such
a question could never be settled. Rather, the following is a starting point described by
Rawls from which justice can be considered. Further, it will be shown that jury
nullification can be contemplated in terms of justice based on Rawls' ideas.
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Rawls and A Theory ofJustice
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls asks and answers the question," What principles of
justice would rational, self-interested individuals agree to in the original position of
equality?" In order to answer this question, Rawls first discusses the role of justice in
society. The purpose of justice is to ensure that an individual's fundamental interests are
not sacrificed for the general welfare. This idea signals a rejection of the utilitarian
notion that an increase in the greater good validates the sacrifices of a few (1999, 20).
Individual liberties can never be used as bargaining tools.
A well-ordered society advances the desired ends of its members and is regulated
by a public conception of justice, which is based on a compromise between individual
concepts or perceptions of justice. A society's conception of justice is "a characteristic
set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining the proper
distribution of benefits and burdens of social cooperation" (1999, 5).

While an

individual's concept of justice may be influenced by his or her position in society, a
society's conception of justice is to be free from prejudice. It is understood that everyone
in a given society accepts the same principles of justice and that social institutions
comply with these principles.
The state in which it is possible to identify true principles of justice and
essentially move beyond differing concepts toward agreement on a single conception is in
the original position. Parties in the original position are to agree upon principles of
justice that will govern their associations with each other, assign basic fundamental
rights, and also dictate the distribution of benefits by social institutions. The principles
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accepted by parties in the original position are applicable to all future agreements
between members of society and also are binding on social institutions.
Equality is the key to the original position. All parties in this state are equally
uninformed as to the role each will assume once in society. More specifically, no one
knows his or her eventual socioeconomic status, gender, race, talents, abilities, or any
other characteristic that would distinguish one individual from another. Parties in this
state of being equally uninformed are said to be behind a veil of ignorance ( 1999, 1 1823), which ensures equality and prevents any one party from advocating principles that,
in application, would allow one group to have an unfair advantage over another. The
original position can be regarded as almost a pre-birth state. That is, parties in the
original position are unborn in the sense that they have not experienced society as
members of groups. While in this pre-birth state they are charged with creating the type
of society into which they would like to be born.
While members of a society are equal while in the original position, they are not
equal in society itself. People are born into different social positions. Some positions are
more favorable than others. These positions act as starting points that will most likely
determine the outcomes of individuals' lives. Those born into more favorable positions
begin their lives with an advantage over those born into less favorable positions. This
advantage seemingly allows certain individuals to attain a greater sum of the benefits· of
social cooperation. Further, social institutions tend to favor certain starting points over
others in terms of allocating benefits. Without some overarching guidelines, individuals
born into more favorable positions could conceivably acquire all or most of the benefits
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derived from membership in a society, leaving those members born into the least
favorable positions with nothing. This idea of different starting points implies that
inequality in society is inherent and inevitable. Principles of justice are supposed to act
as equalizers of sorts by requiring an equitable distribution of society's benefits. While
justice can never require an equality of results for members of society, it can require an
equality of opportunity.
While parties in the original position are free to select from any range of just
principles, they will recognize a need to prioritize these principles. Rawls notes:
Now being rational, the persons in the original position recognize that they
should consider the priority of these principles. For if they wish to
establish agreed standards of adjudicating their claims on one another,
they will need principles for assigning weights. They cannot assume that
their intuitive judgments of priority will in general be the same; given their
different positions in society they surely will not (1999, 37).
Rawls further suggests that the principles be placed in lexical order. This requires that
the first principle be satisfied before proceeding to the second principle and that the
second principl� be satisfied before moving to the third and so on. One principle cannot
be pursued until those that come before it have been fulfilled. The principle of equal
liberty should come before any principle regulating social or economic inequality. This
implies:
that the basic structure of society is to arrange the inequalities of wealth
and authority in ways consistent with the equal liberties required by the
preceding principle (1999, 38).
Society is inherently unequal, given that men are born into different social
positions. The only just means of compensating for this inherent inequality that occurs
when parties are no longer in the original position is through application of the difference
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principle. The difference principle holds that inequalities are just only if they result in
compensation or additional benefits for the least advantaged group (1999, 68-9). The
most advantaged group should not become even better off unless there is a proportional
benefit to the least advantaged group. This implies that one group should not benefit at
the expense of another, and that a group with more advantages should not benefit at the
expense of a group with fewer advantages. The principles of justice selected by parties in
the original position should be such as to avoid further penalizing the least advantaged
group simply on the grounds that they were born into lesser social positions. Further, no
group can ever be required to compromise its basic rights or fundamental liberties as a
condition of some bargaining process with another group.
The original position defines justice in terms of fairness. However, Rawls is clear
that justice is not the same as fairness. Persons in the original position identify principles
of justice in an even-handed manner without bias or prejudice and intend these principles
to apply to all members of society in the same way. This set of principles can

be

regarded as one society' s conception of justice. That these principles are consistently
applicable to all members of society is fairness. It is this application that is fair, which is
distinct from claiming that a universal concept of justice or one society' s conception of
justice is fair. Since the original position cannot be achieved in a literal sense, societies
that satisfy the principles of justice as fairness come as close as possible to the ideal
scheme the original position suggests.
The original position might seem a rather impractical, unworkable concept given
that men cannot actually enter into a pre-birth state to determine the kind of society in
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which they would ultimately like to live. Also, there is the issue of entrenched prejudices
against certain less advantaged social groups that might preclude members of society
from selecting principles of justice that are pure. According to Rawls, however, one can
enter the original position at any time simply by excluding prejudice from decision
making.

Jury Nullification and the Original Position
The original position is a hypothetical situation. However, Rawls outlines a way,
known as the four-stage sequence, in which the two principles of justice can be applied to
existing political institutions.

This moves the principles of justice beyond abstract

discussion to concrete application.

Before Rawls' theory can be related to jury

nullification, it is necessary to briefly outline the four-stage sequence.
Rawls begins by noting that a citizen makes three kinds of judgments (1999, 171).
First, a citizen makes a judgment as to the justice of legislation and social policies
advanced by the government. Making this judgment does not require that the citizen
agree with every piece of legislation or every policy.

Secondly, the citizen makes

judgment as to which constitutional arrangements are just means for reconciling
competing claims. That is, the citizen evaluates which constitutional arrangements are
just for reconciling disagreement over policies or laws among citizens. Finally, a citizen
must be able to determine when there is no longer a political obligation to comply with
the will of the majority. Rawls uses these considerations in the four-stage sequence,
which is "a device for applying the principles of justice" (1999, 176).
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Rawls initially supposes that once parties agree upon the principles of justice,
they leave the original position to return to their places in society. Once in society, the
parties judge social practices by the principles adopted in the original position. However,
this process is not as simple as it might seem. Instead, Rawls argues that several
intermediate stages take place in a definite sequence within this process. "Each stage is
to represent an appropriate point of view from which certain kinds of questions are
considered" (1999, 172). The level of knowledge available to the parties at each stage is
commensurate with the level of knowledge that is necessary for the objectives of each
stage to be completed (1999, 175).
The first stage involves a constitutional convention of sorts. Here, the parties are
to define the powers of government and the basic rights of citizens and also decide how
to mediate and cope with diverse political views. Since the parties have agreed upon a
conception of justice, the veil of ignorance has been partially lifted revealing general
characteristics about the society within which the parties will eventually become
members. These general characteristics include the type of available natural resources,
the level of economic development, and the political culture. Based on these general
characteristics, the parties are to choose the most appropriate type of constitution that will
lead to the enactment of the most just and appropriate legislation. According to Rawls:
[A] just constitution would be a just procedure arranged to insure a just
outcome. The procedure would be the political process governed by the
constitution, the outcome the body of enacted legislation, while the
principles of justice would define an independent criteria for both
procedure and outcome.. . [T]he first problem is to design a just procedure.
To do this the liberties of equal citizenship must be incorporated into and
protected by the constitution. These liberties include those of liberty of
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conscience and freedom of thought, liberty of the person, and equal
political rights (1999, 173).
Since perfect procedural justice is impossible, the parties must recognize that
some procedures lead to a greater quantity of unjust laws than others. They should,
therefore, choose the procedure that leads to the enactment of the fewest unjust laws.
Legislation is enacted during the second stage. While the first" stage reflects the first
principle of justice, the difference principle is reflected in the second stage. Application
of the difference principle requires "that social and economic policies be aimed at
maximizing the long-term expectations of the least advantaged group" ( 1999, 175).
The rules are applied to society in the third stage by judges and administrators.
By the time parties reach this stage, they have full knowledge of their individual
circumstances since all the rules have been agreed upon.
The fourth stage deals with the limits of political obligation. It is here that the
third consideration of every citizen comes into play, whether there is always a duty to
comply with the majority and, if there is, how far this duty extends. As Rawls notes, civil
disobedience and conscientious refusal occur in the fourth stage.
Jury nullification can be understood in terms of the original position as something
that occurs in the fourth stage after the principles of justice have been agreed upon and
put into practice. This thesis advances a definition that equates nullification to protest.
However, protest can take many forms, ranging from simply speaking out against a law
or policy to engaging in civil disobedience. In some circumstances, jury nullification is
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only a way for jurors to voice their disapproval, but under a different set of circumstances
nullification as protest can be considered civii disobedience.

Jury Nullification is Civil Disobedience
Jury nullification can be justified as an act of civil disobedience, at least under a
particular set of circumstances. Before detailing these circumstances, however, it is
necessary to first offer a general definition of civii disobedience and then outline a theory
under which civil disobedience can be understood and justified. Finally, an interpretation
of jury nullification as an act of civil disobedience will be offered.
In a basic sense, civil disobedience is defined as a deliberate but nonviolent
breaking of the law in order to call attention to a law or class of laws of questionable
legitimacy or morality (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed.). This definition is more or less
echoed by Fortas, who defines civil disobedience as "peaceful, nonviolent disobedience
of a law which is itself unjust and which the protester challenges as invalid or
unconstitutional" (1968, 57).
Some contend that included in this definition is the requirement th3:t the dissenters
be willing to accept the punishment for breaching the law, however, this addendum may
not always be included. For example, Greenawal�, while declining to offer an explicit
definition, notes that the inclusion of a willingness to accept punishment on the part of
the dissenter need not be included for the meaning of civil disobedience to be complete.
These definitions can be regarded as starting points for understanding civil disobedience.
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Greenawalt offers some - additional criteria necessary for understanding civil
disobedience. At the outset, Greenawalt notes that the continued functioning of society
rests on compromise. Each individual cannot have exactly what he wants all the time.
However, there comes a point where the law becomes so intolerable as to make
compromise impossible. At such a point, civil disobedience can be regarded as a path to
change when dissenters disobey the relevant law in a way that receives maximum notice
and has maximum impact. He notes that civil disobedience is morally justifiable when
there is a probability that its consequences will somehow be socially desirable (1970, 50).
A second distinction that Greenawalt makes is that not every unlawful act can be
considered civil disobedience. When a person breaks the law, he does so either to avoid
its impact or to call attention to the law in order to encourage change (1970, 66).
Instances of civil disobedience fall into the latter category. Civil disobedience occurs in
response to a law which the dissenter finds objectionable.
Further there are two types of civil disobedience- direct and indirect. Direct civil
disobedience occurs when the law breached by the dissenter is the same law to which the
dissenter objects. Indirect civil disobedience, on the other hand, occurs when the law that
is breached is not the one that the dissenter finds objectionable but, instead, is broken to
call attention to a different law or policy to which the dissenter opposes. With regard to
indirect civil disobedience, Greenawalt uses the example of a rally to protest racial
discrimination (1970, 67). If protestors block a street and thus impede traffic, the law
that is broken is some type of traffic law, to which the protestors likely have no objection.
The policy to which the protestors actually object involves racial discrimination.
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However, the protestors breached the traffic law in order to call attention to the
discriminatory policy that they were in fact speaking out against.
Along with some basic definitions, a theory of civil disobedience is also
necessary for understanding the ways by which jurors may be engaging in civil
disobedience by opting for nullification. The theory put forth by Rawls in A Theory of
Justice is useful for reaching this end. Since Rawls is both a philosopher and a theorist,

he asks and answers his own questions. Initially, the following question is posed: At
what point does compromise in the interest of society become impossible and the duty to
comply with the law cease to be binding in view of the right to defend liberty and oppose
injustice? In answering this question, Rawls' theory is intended to account for the role of
civil disobedience within an orderly, legitimate democratic regime.

The theory is

intended for a "nearly just" society, one that has only a few blatant unjust laws. In such a
society, civil disobedience is distinct from revolution; acts of civil disobedience are not
attempts to overthrow the government but efforts to shed light on injustices perpetrated
by it (Rawls 1999, 3 19-20).
A complete theory of civil disobedience is composed of three parts. First, a
theory of civil disobedience offers a definition that distinguishes it from other types of
dissent. To this end, Rawls defines civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent, political,
and conscientious act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a
change in the law or policies of the government. This definition allows for both direct
and indirect instances of civil disobedience. True civil disobedience, according the
Rawls, is an act that somehow resonates with the majority's sense of justice. That is, it is
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couched in a public conception of justice that permits the majority to appreciate the
injustice to which the dissenters are calling attention. Further, true civil disobedience is
not based on claims of self-interest, religion, or morality but is based on a "commonly
shared· conception of justice that underlies the political order" (Rawls 1999, 321). Those
engaging in civil disobedience do so not create a constitutional case or controversy to be
settled by the courts; rather, even if the courts do weigh in to uphold the law, . the
dissenters are prepared to oppose it.
Rawls notes that one feature that distinguishes civil disobedience from other
forms of dissent against the government and from revolution is that it is necessarily
nonviolent.

This quality is indispensable for two reasons.

First, acts of civil

disobedience are not threats of force because force overshadows the need to express
profound convictions held by the dissenters. Civil disobedience is intended to call
attention to injustice and those engaging in civil disobedience must be careful not to
create chaos or disorder that might detract from their message.

Secondly, civil

disobedience is necessarily nonviolent because dissenters must express respect for a
general rule of law even while breaking a particular law, if their message is to resonate
with the majority's conception of justice. Finally, civil disobedience must be committed
in the open. This distinguishes it from revolutionary acts that may be committed secretly.
Civil disobedience is public act that addresses public principles.
A second objective that a theory of civil disobedience achieves is elaborating the
conditions under which civil disobedience is justified.

Rawls argues that civil

disobedience is be used to address only serious instances of injustice, namely those that
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violate a commitment to equal liberty (the first principle of justice recognized by parties
in the original position). Further, civil disobedience should be regarded as a last resort,
utilized only after appeals to the majority have been ignored and attempts to affect
change through traditional political channels have failed. Finally, Rawls notes that there
is a limit to the amount of civil disobedience that any one society can tolerate. Too much
rebellion, even if it is peaceful, threatens society' s stability. Where many groups have
the right to engage in ci vii disobedience, there should be a level of cooperation among the
groups to regulate the amount of dissent.
Finally, Rawls' theory seeks to explain the role of civil disobedience in a
democratic society. This role is twofold. First, those who engage in civil disobedience
intend:
to address the sense of justice of the majority and serve fair notice that in
one's sincere and considered opinion the conditions of free cooperation
are being violated. We are appealing to others to reconsider, to put
themselves in our position, and to recognize that they cannot expect us to
acquiesce indefinitely in the terms they impose upon us (Rawls 1999, 33536).
Rawls' theory assumes that there is a public conception of justice that will be recognized
by members of the majority when confronted with an act of civil disobedience. Each
individual' s conception of justice may be slightly different, so long as everyone' s
conception i s sufficiently similar s o as to produce similar political judgments. The appeal
that those engaging in ci vii disobedience make to the majority' s conception of justice is
crucial; absent this type of appeal, the majority may feel inclined to become more
repressive in order to silence voices of dissent. Secondly, society is supposed to be a
cooperative venture. This implies that those members of society who experience serious
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injustice are nofrequired to bear it in silence. Civil disobedience, in that it often serves
as a starting point to mitigating injustice, has a stabilizing effect on society has a whole.
Rawls contends that, when practiced prudently, civil disobedience lends stability and
legitimacy to the continued existence of just institutions.
Before relating Rawls' theory of civil disobedience to jury nullification, it is
necessary to briefly evaluate the status of jury nullification in federal courts in light of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit' s ruling in United States v. Thomas ( 1997. Nos.
95-1337 et al (2d.Cir.)).
In 1994, a group of 16 individuals were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking.
Ten of these individuals were tried together under federal narcotics law on 30 counts of
conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and crack cocaine as well as actual
possession and distribution of both substances. The jury found five defendants guilty on
all counts and acquitted the remaining five defendants. On appeal, the defendants argue
that the trial judge abused his discretion by dismissing one juror after the jury had retired
to deliberate on the grounds that said juror intended to engage in nullification.
In Thomas, the court considered two questions. First, whether the advocating of
jury nullification by a juror is misconduct constituting "just cause" for dismissal after the
jury has begun deliberating under Rule23(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;
secondly, if advocating nullification is "just cause" for dismissal, what is the evidentiary
standard that must be met prior to excusing the offending juror. Only the court's analysis
of the first question is relevant here.
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Rule 23(b) requires, in part, that "where the court finds it necessary to excuse . a
juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the
court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 1 1 jurors" (Thomas 1 997, 5).
With little analysis, the court answers the first question in the affirmative, holding that the
advocacy of jury nullification by a juror in a federal trial is "just cause" for dismissal.
The court asserts that such behavior is "an obvious violation of a juror' s oath and duty"
(Thomas 1997, 1 ). The court's decision seems to rest on the notion that jurors do not
have an express right to engage in nullification. Further, the court maintains that trial
judges should act to prevent nullification at every opportunity.
Jury nullification does not normally qualify as civil disobedience.

One

fundamental element of civil disobedience is the breaking of some law by those wishing
to dissent. Further, if one accepts the definition of civil disobedience that requires that
the dissenter be willing to accept punishment for breaking the law, then jury nullification
cannot be considered civil disobedience because neither a jury nor individual jurors can
be punished for a verdict. If nullification is not civil disobedience for juries, then it
certainly . cannot be so for individual jurors.
However, the ruling in Thomas indicates that nullification, at least in federal
court, is illegal.

While the only consequence for jurors found to be advocating

nullification is dismissal, the language in Thomas indicates that nullification is clearly
proscribed conduct. It is considered a violation of the juror's oath, and trial judges are
encouraged to nip instances of nullification in the bud.
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Rawl's theory has several requirements in order for an instance of lawbreaking to
be considered cfvil disobedience. First, it must be public act. Secondly, the act must be
nonviolent. A third requirement is that the act be political in nature and have as its aim a
change in a law or policy that the dissenter regards as seriously unjust. Finally, the act
must resonate with the majority's conception of justice or, in the words of Rawls, must be
such that it is clearly based in a "commonly shared conception of justice that underlies
the political order" (Rawls 1999, 321).
If one accepts this thesis' definition of and framework for nullification, then
instances of nullification in federal court under Thomas are also instances of civil
disobedience. In order to test the veracity of this statement, Rawls' theory of civil
disobedience is applied.

Again, jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits an

otherwise guilty defendant in order to protest the law under which the defendant is
charged.
First, Rawls' theory requires that nullification be a public act if it is to be
considered civil disobedience. The secrecy of jury deliberations seems to present a
hurdle to satisfying this requirement. However, after a jury verdict is read, it becomes a
matter of public record. Further, if a juror is· dismissed after deliberations have begun, as
happened in Thomas, it is likely that the Court of Appeals will have to address the
dismissal in its opinion, if the defendants challenge the verdict reached in the lower court.
If this occurs, then nullification becomes an explicit part of the trial record. Finally, after
a trial over, jurors are free to explain their reasons for reaching a particular verdict to the
media. If the jury engaged in nullification, its members will likely have the opportunity
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to say so on the evening news or in the paper. While nullification may occur within the
confines of the jury room, the verdict and perhaps certain aspects of the deliberation
process can be made public. This may be enough to satisfy the first requirement of
Rawls' theory.
Secondly, Rawls mandates that any act of civil disobedience must be nonviolent.
It is difficult to imagine that jury deliberations could ever be violent. It seems reasonable
to claim that nullification, at least inside the jury room, is always a nonviolent event.
Third, an act of civil disobedience must be political in nature and have as its aim a
change in a law or policy. When jurors engage in nullification in order to protest some
law or policy, nullification becomes something more than simply choosing to acquit a
defendant in spite of the evidence. When nullification occurs in protest, it becomes
political speech. Further, each time a jury nullifies a particular law, it is calling attention
to some defect in that law. If juries consistently refuse to convict defendants under one
particular law, one of two things may result. Either prosecutors will decline to prosecute
persons accused of violating said law, rendering the law dead in effect, or the law itself
will be changed through an act of the legislature, the executive, or referendum. When
jurors engage in nullification . in protest, their intent is to elicit a change in the law. The
third prong of Rawls' theory is thus satisfied.
Finally, an act of civil disobedience must appeal to the majority's conception of
justice. There have been occasions that laws were so blatantly unjust that juries refused
to apply them. This was the case with seditious libel, fugitive slave laws, and laws
relating to prohibition. That these laws are no longer in effect indicates that the majority
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was made aware·'of their injustice. Jury nullification is one way to highlight deficiency in
the law. When nullification is used in this way, it seems likely that the majority will
recognize it again as it has before.

Conclusion
Contrary to the court's claim in Thomas, jury nullification as an act of protest
does not violate the juror's oath or duty. As Rawls notes:
[I]f justified civil disobedience seems to threaten CIVIC concord, the
responsibility falls not upon those who protest but upon those whose abuse
of authority and power justifies such opposition. For to employ the
coercive apparatus of the state in order to maintain manifestly unjust
institutions is itself a form of illegitimate force that men in due course
have a right to resist (Rawls 1999, 342).
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Chapter 5"". "Jury Nullification is a Bad Idea":
Antinullification Position

An Explanation of the

Introduction
The debate over jury nullification centers on one of two questions. First, while
jurors have the power to engage in nullification, should they exercise this power?
Secondly, should jurors be informed that nullification is one option available for their
consideration during deliberations? The second question is not addressed in this thesis.
With regard to the first question, opponents of jury nullification contend that it is never
appropriate for a jury to engage in nullification. Adherents to this antinullification stance
advance number of arguments in support of their claim. Some are not worth discussing,
for example, the position of King and others that jury nullification is a nuisance (King
1998, 446-47). However, there are five core arguments that need to be explained in order
to gain a more complete understanding of the controversy surrounding jury nullification.

Jury Nullification is Detrimental to Democracy
In one sense, this argument can be rephrased as "jury nullification will lead to
anarchy" because those who advance this view do little to distinguish between cultivating
anarchy and harming democracy. This position defines jury nullification essentially as
"juror lawlessness" and contends that if jurors are free to determine the law for
themselves that anarchy will result because nullification nurtures a disregard and
disrespect for the law. Niedermeir, Horowitz, and Kerr (1999) have developed what they
call chaos theory that necessarily embodies this viewpoint. Chaos theory holds that when
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jurors are given a nullification instruction by the trial judge, they will feel free to allow
their individual biases to have an undue impact on their verdict. When chaos theory
prevails, advocates argue, ours becomes the government of men rather than of laws that
the architects of the criminal justice system sought to guard against.
In another sense, antinullification advocates maintain that nullification permits a
single jury to usurp the will of the majority as expressed in the law (Scheflin and Van
Dyke 1980, 91). While isolated instances of nullification are not likely to pose much of
problem, nullification in the aggregate is problematic because the jury is not a
majoritarian institution. One of the cornerstones of democracy is majority rule. Related
to this is the implication that the law reflects the will of the majority and can only be
changed following a shift in majority sentiment. Antinullification advocates assert that
the jury is not truly representative of the community from which it is chosen and certainly
not representative of the larger majority found in the state or nation. If this is true, then
the jury is a minority that is able to undermine the will of the majority by refusing to
apply the laws enacted with the majority's consent.
Ideally, the jury is a representative cross-section of the community from which it
is drawn, but time, money, employment, and other circumstances often allow potential
jurors to be excused from fulfilling their civic duty. Further, preemptory challenges
made during voir dire permit lawyers to remove jurors from the jury pool for a variety of
reasons. The jury that is ultimately impaneled may not mirror its community at all.
Antinullification advocates then conclude that jury nullification can in no way be

47

construed as reflective of the conscience of the community when the jury itself is not
reflective of the community.
This idea is compounded when the unanimity requirement is considered. Almost
every state requires that jury verdicts in criminal trials be unanimous.

Unanimous

verdicts carry with them a certain amount of credibility because the twelve people
charged with the task of weighing facts in a given case agreed on an outcome. Assume,
briefly, that while a jury may not be representative of its community, at least one member
of the majority group is impaneled as a juror. Even if the other eleven jurors represent a
variety of minority viewpoints, juror number twelve is expected to speak for the majority.
In this situation, a unanimous verdict reached by this jury may not accurately reflect the
sentiment of the community.

However, the unanimity of the verdict still lends it

credibility and the verdict perceived as reflecting the will of community because at least
one member of the majority participated in reaching it. Antinullification proponents
maintain that, given the possibility for situations like· this to occur, instances of
nullification cannot be said to be expressive of the community' s conscience. Instead,
instances of nullification may only be examples of a hijacking of the criminal justice
system by the minority, resulting in a perverted sort of minority rule.

Jury Nullification Permits Jurors to Act as Legislators
Jury nullification advocates often advance the view that jurors are in a much
better position to know and express popular will than are legislators. While legislators
are supposed to be representatives of the people, they may, in fact, be far removed from
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their constituents · and out of touch with the desires of those whose votes put them in
office. Members of

a jury,

on the other hand, are the people (St. John 1997, 2577).

Therefore, jurors are in the best position to represent the views of the people. One way
that jurors might express popular sentiment is through nullification. The message that
instances of nullification send is that "the people", represented by the jury, find
objectionable some feature of a particular law. When nullification occurs, jurors are, in
effect, supplanting the will of the legislature with the will of the community.
Those opposed to nullification argue that, when this .occurs, jurors are behaving as
legislators; in nullifying the effects of one law, jurors are essentially replacing with a
different "law" that they perceive as more appropriate. Antinullification advocates find
this unacceptable for several reasons. First, legislators, unlike jurors, are elected. Since
legislators must concern themselves with reelection, they are inclined to be responsive to
the desires of their constituents. An unresponsive legislator is likely to find himself out
of office come election time.
There is· not a similar mechanism in place to oust jurors who do not represent the
desires of the community from which they are selected. In fact, jurors are insulated in a
way that legislators are not- jurors always deliberate in secret and are not required to
explain a verdict nor can they be punished for it. Taking these things together suggests
that jurors are granted some sort of protected status unavailable to legislators. Arguably,
jurors are afforded this insulation because the criminal justice system has an interest in
juries returning verdicts that are in accordance with the law.
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Jurors should then respond to this interest with respect for the law. That is, jurors
should feel bound to reach a verdict consistent with the court' s interpretation of the law.
The court does not look over the juror' s shoulder; there is an expectation that each juror
will be on his or her honor and follow the instructions of the trial judge (St. John 1997,
2583). Therefore, jurors who engage in nullification are acting in bad faith by refusing to
do this.
The remedy for unresponsive legislators is in the election process. By electing
new representatives, the people can bring about changes in the existing law. A bad law
can be amended or repealed and replace4 with a new, more acceptable law. A law
enacted in bad faith is, at worst, temporary.

However, in most circumstances, an

acquittal reached in bad faith is forever.
Secondly, that nullification gives jurors the power to behave as legislators is
objectionable because, at best, a single jury is only representative of the community from
which it is selected.

However, criminal laws are not made on a community-by

community basis. Rather, criminal laws are formulated for entire states or an entire
nation. Given the norms of jury selection, it is impossible that a single jury will be
representative of an entire state or an entire nation. As was noted earlier, one of the
cornerstones of democracy is majority rule, and the jury is minoritarian not majoritarian
institution. A minority should never be permitted to "nullify the effects" of a law enacted
by a majority (Scheflin and Van Dyke 1980, 54).
A final argument advanced by antinullification advocates involves the status of
the jury in relation to other players in the criminal justice process. The jury is one of
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several players in the criminal justice process, with the legislature, executive, prosecutor,
and judge rounding out the cast of characters. Nullification advocates maintain that the
jury's status is equal to that of the legislature (who writes the criminal code), the
executive (who might sign some or all criminal statutes into law), the prosecutor (who
decided to charge and bring to trial a given defendant), and the judge (who allows the
prosecutor to proceed with a trial) (St. John 1997, 2585). The jury's role is to assess the
guilt of a given defendant in light of a particular law.

When a jury engages in

nullification, it is essentially exercising a sort of veto power against one of the other
government actors. When a jury exercises its veto power, it is using its discretion to
grant a defendant mercy.
This line of reasoning, however, does not convince antinullification advocates.
They maintain that the jury's status is subordinate to that of other government actors,
thereby requiring that the jury take its cues when interpreting the law from one of its
superiors, like the judge. It is here that antinullification advocates argue that nullification
can never be construed as mercy. At any point from the time a law was enacted to the
time a particular defendant accused of violating that law goes to trial, a government actor
whose status is superior to that of the jury's can act so as to grant a defendant mercy. For
example, the legislature could have chosen to define a crime in such a way that the
defendant's conduct would not be considered criminal or the prosecutor could decide not
to prosecute a given defendant. Antinullification advocates conclude that the criminal
justice system is already stacked in favor of the defendant and that the defendant already
enjoys sufficient protection absent the possibility of nullification.
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Jury Nullification is Antithetical to the Rule of Law
Related to the suggestion that jury nullification cultivates anarchy is the argument
that nullification is contrary to the rule of law. This is true for at least three reasons.
First, jury nullification increases the degree to which jury verdicts are subjective.
Arguably, there is a certain amount of subjectivity involved in any verdict. Clark notes
that jurors are influenced by a variety of "extra legal" factors that are completely
divorced from the trial itself, such as the physical attractiveness of the defendant (2000,
48-53). Clark further argues that these extra legal factors have a tendency to impact jury
verdicts. However, the rule of law is an objective standard by which a defendant's guilt
or innocence can be judged. Jury nullification encourages jurors to disregard this
objective standard, resulting in verdicts that are arbitrary.
Further, the rule of law requires a consistent application of the law from one case
to the next. Jury nullification offers no guarantee of this type of consistency. The
arbitrary basis for one jury verdict will likely be very different from the arbitrary basis for
another jury verdict. A consistent application of the rule of law acts a sort of check
against this type of human error.
Secondly, as Justice Harlan noted in Spaif, simply because a law is unpopular in
no way implies that it is also unjust. By removing or disregarding the objective standard
by which defendants should be judged, jury nullification encourages the enforcement of
only popular laws. This, according to Harlan, invites peril by allowing for a government
of men rather than laws (Sparf 1895, 103).
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_ Finally, it is the duty of the courts to protect the rights of minorities. Jury
nullification advocates argue that this alone justifies informing jurors of their nullification
power as well as encouraging them to exercise it. However, there are already numerous
safeguards built into our framework of government that prevent the majority from
oppressing or taking advantage of the minority. It is likely that the person who finds
himself a member of the minority in one instance will find himself in the majority at
some later time.

This implies that only those minorities situated in some unique

circumstance deserve additional special protection from the courts.
The law has consistently recognized special protection only for those minorities
that are "discrete and insular" (J. Stone, United States v. Carolene Products 1938, 304
U.S. 144). The term "discrete and insular minority" as come to imply, roughly, those
groups that are excluded from the political process. However, jury nullification could
lead to the protection of minorities that are not discrete and insular, according to
opponents. Without adherence to the rule of law, the courts· could become a haven for
those undeserving of its protection.

Jury Nullification Cannot Guarantee Due Process
It is often assumed that nullification can work only in favor of the defendant. At
least this is the position advanced by most nullification advocates.

However, as

nullification opponents are quick to point out, there have been occasions when defendants
have appealed on the grounds that the jury engaged in nullification to their detriment.
Such appeals are most common in states where trial judges instruct the jury that they may
53

opt for nullification when reaching their verdict. While nullification advocates like to
claim only that nullification presents the jury the opportunity to exercise mercy, it is also
possible for a jury to exact vengeance via nullification. For example, a jury may choose
to convict a defendant who has committed some particularly heinous or reprehensible act,
regardless of whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof.

Horowitz, in

particular, has found that jurors are more likely to seek revenge against especially
repugnant defendants when they are explicitly instructed as to their power to nullify the
law. According to Horowitz, this encourages the jurors to consider legally irrelevant
factors when choosing a verdict, such as personal animus for the defendant (1988, 450).

Jury Nullification is Dangerous due to an Absence of Error-Correcting Mechanisms
When a defendant is convicted, there is always the possibility that the
conviction will be overturned on appeal. The implication here is that if a jury wrongly
convicts a defendant, there are mechanisms in place under which said defendant can seek
relief. This is not true when a jury wrongly acquits a defendant. As those opposed to
nullification are quick to point out, there are not error-correcting mechanisms in place if a
jury fails to convict a defendant who is clearly guilty.
While it is difficult to know how often erroneous appeals occur, it is likely that a
jury wrongly acquits at least some of the time.

There are a variety of possible

explanations for this, including that the jury was simply confused. That is, the jury may
have mistakenly acquitted the defendant because the trial judge's instructions on the law
were misleading or difficult to understand. Juries are never held responsible for the
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verdict nor can ihdividual jurors be bound to explain it, so it is not outside the realm of
possibility to suggest that juries mistakenly acquit some defendants some of the time.
However, nullification opponents assert that the sole culprit for erroneous
acquittals is nullification. It is difficult to allege that this claim is wholly inaccurate
because no contradictory evidence is available. However, no evidence to support this
claim is available either. Nonetheless, those opposed to nullification note that it is this
uncertainty that points to a need to stifle any talk of nullification in the jury room. That
is, nullification opponents contend that if there is the slightest possibility that a jury might
wrongly acquit a guilty defendant, then this is enough to prohibit nullification altogether.
An erroneous conviction may be overturned on appeal; an erroneous acquittal cannot, in
most cases, be reversed.

Conclusion
Those who assume a position antagonistic to jury nullification claim that it is just
a bad idea to permit jurors to disregard the law. They argue that nullification poses a
danger to democracy, is threat to the sanctity of the rule of law, and impermissibly invites
laypeople to legislate from the jury box. Further, they assert that the absence of error
correcting mechanisms and no guarantee of due process should be sufficient to prohibit
nullification altogether. However, as the succeeding chapters illustrate, many of these
claims falter where jury nullification is properly understood.
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Chapter 6- Answering the Critics- Why Jury Nullification is Important

Introduction
Opponents to jury nullification assert that instances of nullification foreshadow
anarchy, herald the downfall of due process and democracy, and cultivate disrespect and
disregard for the rule of law. In short, jury nullification is just a bad idea. However, it is
possible that the critics are mistaken. Perhaps jury nullification is more than an artifact
unfit for modem criminal justice. Perhaps there is a way to define and practice jury
nullification so that it helps the American legal system achieve its goals of justice and
fairness for all. Jury nullification advocates allege that these things are possible.
Advocates claim that there are two key features of jury nullification that the
critics ignore. First, allowing jurors the freedom to engage in nullification is not the same
as giving them carte blanche to select any outcome that suits their fancy. There are
guidelines for nullification and circumstances under which it is both appropriate and
justifiable. Secondly, nullification is not one of the norms of jury behavior; it does not
happen every day. Upwards of 90% of all criminal cases end in a plea bargain. Of the
remaining roughly 10% of cases, nullification will not typically be warranted or even
seriously considered as a possible outcome in every case. Advocates claim that acquittals
arising from nullification are rare.
Advocates typically contend that jury nullification occurs when a jury chooses to
follow its collective conscience to acquit an otherwise guilty defendant either because the
jury somehow objects to the law under which the defendant is charged or because the
jury finds that the application of a particular law to a particular defendant would not
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result in justice. Justifying such a broad definition has its problems. In fact, the critics
claim that justifying such a general definition cannot be done to a sufficient or even
adequate degree of satisfaction. In response to the critics, it may be that a more focused
definition is needed. This would allow for the argument that there is at least one set of
circumstances under which nullification is necessary, desirable, and appropriate, which,
in tum, would refute the critics' blanket suggestion that jury nullification can never be
anything but a bad idea.
For the purposes of this thesis, jury nullification is not so broadly defined. Here,
nullification occurs when a jury chooses to acquit an otherwise guilty defendant because
the jurors are protesting either a particular law or class of laws. Jury nullification is an
act of protest and becomes synonymous with political speech. In this chapter, the ways
by which jury nullification advocates respond to their critics will be briefly explained,
first in general terms and then with regard to the specific definition contemplated by this
thesis.

Jury Nullification is Good for Democracy
As Scheflin and Van Dyke note, those opposed to nullification sensationalize
what jury nullification actually means. Jury nullification does not permit a jury to render
an arbitrary verdict or one that is reached on a whim. Further, nullification is not a
license for the jury to make up the law as it goes. Jury verdicts never create new laws.
Instead, nullification permits a jury to "suspend a particular law in a particular instance
for a particular defendant in the interest of justice" (Scheflin and Van Dyke 1980, 85).
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Advocates maintain the jury nullification actually enhances the democratic
process by allowing for the inclusion of community standards in the criminal justice
process. In this way, nullification permits criminal law to actually become a law of the
people. That is, nullification is an opportunity for direct democracy.
In most instances, the legislative process is not accessible to laypeople. This
means that the average person does not have any direct input as to the laws that dictate
his conduct. At best, this person is reliant on a responsive representative who will enact
laws that are in his interest. Jury nullification encourages citizens as jury members to
reflect critically on the law or laws they are being asked to apply. While juries cannot
make law, nullification still offers jurors an opportunity to assess directly at least some
small portion of the criminal code. Democratic government relies on an involved and
responsive populace. Any opportunity involve the average person more fully in his own
government should be encouraged.
Certainly, there are instances in which direct democracy is undesirable. However,
this is not such an instance. There is little danger that one juror, representing a minority
viewpoint, will succeed in holding the majority hostage because almost every state
requires that jury verdicts in criminal trials be unanimous. In cases where a single juror
stands for a minority perspective, it is more likely that there will be some sort of
compromise between that member and the majority in the interest of a unanimous verdict.
Finally, the majority is should protect the interests of the minority. However, the
Framers' attempts to protect minority rights often work better as pieces of a larger
abstract theory than in terms of actual constitutional guarantees (Butler 1995, 709-10).
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Just as majority rule is one of the cornerstones of democracy, so is the freedom to speak
out in protest against one's government. If jury nullification means nothing else than
political speech and is nothing more than protest against a government that seems to be
overstepping its bounds, then this is enough to justify its existence and continued use in
America's courtrooms.
The Founders clearly regarded free speech as important to the survival of the
nation; it is one of the first enumerated rights included in the Constitution. Dworkin
notes that free speech is vital to democracy and that, while some constraints are
necessarily placed around this right, the best way to provide opportunities for unfettered
expression is "to permit anyone who wished to address the public to do so, in whatever
way and a whatever length he wishes, no matter how unpopular or unworthy the
government or other citizens deem his message to be" (Dworkin 2000, 358). Further,
while no Bill of Rights guarantee is absolute and the courts have placed restrictions
around the Free Speech provision, the right to political speech has continually been
protected. When a jury chooses nullification because it objects to a particular law
regardless of whom the defendant may be, nullification becomes an avenue to protest.
Occasionally, a jury may engage in nullification to express a political viewpoint
with which the majority disagrees.

For example, a jury could choose to acquit a

defendant who is a terminally ill patient on trial for using marijuana as medicine. The
distinction between the definition advanced by this thesis and a more general definition
of jury nullification is that the characteristics of individual defendants play no part in the
jury's decision to nullify. With more general definitions of nullification, there is always
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the possibility that the jury will engage in nullification as an act of mercy or because it
feels that the defendant is being wrongly prosecuted. Here, however, it is recommended
that jury nullification is defensible, if nowhere else, than when the jury is protesting some
law. In the above example, the jury might choose to acquit because it finds possession
laws objectionable not simply because it is sympathetic to the defendant. Democratic
government relies on a degree of political tolerance.

This implies that minority

viewpoints deserve expression even when, perhaps especially when, the majority
disagrees.

Some Problems with the "Juror as Legislator'' Model
Antinullification advocates claim that nullification permits the jury to act as a
mini legislature. This can occur in one of two ways. Either the jury, in opting for
nullification, substitutes its will in place of the law enacted by the legislature or the jury
checks the behavior of other government actors by engaging in nullification. Either way,
antinullification advocates argue, the jury is a minoritarian institution and, therefore,
should not be permitted to impose its will on the majority.
Nullification advocates note that there are some problems with the ''juror as
legislature" model. First, nullification does not permit jurors to "make" law. A jury
verdict can never be understood as creating a new law or fundamentally altering an old
one. Nullification, as Scheflin and Van Dyke note, only permits a jury to suspend an
existing law. Notably, suspending a law is quite distinct from creating a new one because
a jury can never overrule an existing law. Further, a jury verdict in one trial never serves
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as a precedent in another. The effects of any single verdict do not extend beyond the trial
to which it applies.
Those in favor of nullification contend that nullification is necessary because
·,

other government actors may not be at liberty to use their discretion to a defendant's
advantage. This suggestion runs contrary to the argument advanced by those opposed to
nullification, that at any point another actor in the criminal justice system (the legislature,
executive, prosecutor, or judge) could exercise leniency to prevent a particular defendant
from facing prosecution. Nullification advocates note, however, that sometimes this is
not possible. Public pressure or a great deal of publicity may essentially force that hand
of the other players in the criminal justice process. Perhaps a prosecutor feels pressure to
prosecute a particular defendant in response to some kind of public outcry or due to the
nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged. When circumstances are such
that other public officials cannot act mercifully, it is necessary that the jury be so
empowered. The jury is the only player in the political justice process that is somehow
insulated and perhaps immune from public pressure. They can render a merciful verdict
for a given defendant when mercy is available nowhere else.
With regard to equating jury nullification with political speech, it is often the case
that public officials are not free to respond to some minority viewpoints given pressure
from the majority. They are in office, in fact, to represent the majority's interests. This
implies that even if a significant portion of the citizenry feels that a law is somehow
wrong, so long as that portion is not a majority, the law will not change. The jury,
however, can serve as an outlet for the expression of these minority viewpoints. Jury
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nullification can only have an impact in the aggregate. That is, when multiple juries
acquit defendants charged under the same law, it can be said that nullification is, in fact,
highlighting some objectionable feature of that law. By engaging in nullification, jurors
can protest a particular law by refusing to apply it and call attention to a viewpoint that
might not otherwise be heard.

Jury Nullification Offers Equity as a Check against the Rule of Law
''The law on the books is often very different from the law in practice" (Scheflin
and Van Dyke 1980, 88). There is a certain danger that the law will become too far
removed from what the public finds acceptable. Jury nullification keeps the law from
becoming too rigid by offering jurors the opportunity to check the rule of law with a dose
of equity. That is, jury nullification is most likely to occur in cases involving facts that
were obviously not anticipated when the law was written (Scheflin and Van Dyke 1980,
910). The legislature is not omnipotent. They cannot be expected to craft laws fitting for
every conceivable situation. There will be times when a defendant may be charged for
violating a law whose conduct the law was not intended to cover. Because laws are
typically intended to be rules of general applicability, there is a need for flexibility. Jury
nullification allows the law to bend when necessary and is an appropriate response when
the majority overreaches.
Those opposed to nullification contend that nullification only encourages
disregard and disrespect for the rule of law. They argue that the rule of law is an
objective framework by which every defendant should be judged. Further, when jurors
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engage in nullification and render a verdict that deviates from the rule of law, they are
removing the objective criterion that seeks to ensure that every defendant is judged fairly
by being judged by the same standard.
Butler takes the assumption that the rule of law is an objective standard that
must be revered and should always guide jury verdicts and turns it on its head. Butler
contends that the rule of law is a myth (Butler 1995, 706-8). Butler provides evidence for
this claim by citing critical legal theory. Critical legal theory holds, in relevant part, that
any result can be derived from the existing legal doctrine in any and every case. Further,
"the law is indeterminate and incapable of neutral interpretation" (Butler 1995, 707).
According to critical legal theorists, the assertion that the rule of law is some objective
standard is insidious. Instead, the rule of law is relative; it can be construed to mean just
about anything. Butler continues, "When judges 'decide' cases, they 'choose' legal
principles to reach a particular outcome" (Butler 1995, 707). Further, neutrality in the
law is both impossible and undesirable because no single general legal principle can
produce a just outcome in every case. The jury, then, is but another actor in the criminal
justice system. When it nullifies, it is using its power to fashion a particular outcome.
Jury nullification "exposes the indeterminacy of the law but does not create it" (Butler
1995, 708).
Another way to understand how nullification offers equity as a check against the
rule of law is that when the law has become too far-removed from what the citizenry
finds acceptable, nullification presents an opportunity for protest. Some might contend
that the proper manner for those opposed to a particular law or policy to voice their
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discontent is through traditional political channels- by lobbying, voting, and contacting
their representatives in the state legislature or in Congress. However, the traditional
political channels occasionally fail. The ability to succeed in changing the law in this
way assumes that everyone has access. Even in modern America, there are segments of
the population that lack political power and access to decisionmakers and have no way to
attain either.

When the traditional political channels fail to elicit change, jury

nullification offers another way for those dissatisfied with some aspect of the current law
to be heard.
Jurors are not intended to be tools of the state and they do not surrender their right
to free speech upon entering a courtroom. Moreover, the more often a jury engages in
nullification, the more it calls attention to some defect in the current law. Nullification is
a more effective act of protest than picketing or petitioning or holding a rally. Rather
than simply talking about a need for change, jurors who engage in nullification are acting
in way that creates change, even if that change is only on a small scale, for a particular
defendant in a particular trial.

Jury Nullification does not Violate Due Process
Those who argue that jury nullification is a bad idea contend that nullification ·
does not always work in favor of the defendant. That is, the jury is just as likely to use its
nullification power to exact vengeance as it is to grant mercy. When juries convict
defendants whose guilt has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, they are violating
the defendant's guarantee of due process.
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Certainly, there is a likelihood that the

conviction will be overturned on appeal, but this does not justify subjecting an innocent
person to a taxing appeals process. To the extent that a defendant inay not succeed on
appeal, jury nullification invites the possibility that innocent defendants will be
wrongfully punished.
Nullification advocates assert that nullification is permissible only when it serves
to further the goals of the legal system. Arguably, such goals include sending criminals,
not innocent people, to prison to pay for their crimes. As Conrad note.s:
Many of the defendants facing trial in criminal courtrooms across America
are no threat to their neighbors. They are harmless violators of victimless
crime laws, tax laws, regulatory laws, licensing laws, or political
protestors. They are mercy killers who have assisted a loved one to end
his or her suffering, only to be put through a second round of torture as
their personal tragedy is played out in court and in the press. They are
peaceful gun owners who wish to be equipped to protect themselves, if
need be. They are cancer, AIDS, glaucoma, and multiple sclerosis (MS)
patients who grow and smoke marijuana to alleviate their suffering. They
are battered women who after years of abuse, stand up to their batterers.
These are not the people who prey upon society, these are the people
society preys upon (1998, 143).
Moreover, a proper jury instruction that includes nullification also stipulates that the jury
must not convict unless convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the jury is actually representative of the community, "the prejudices of individual jurors
should cancel each other out to produce a just outcome" (Schetlin and Van Dyke 1980,
94).

The Criminal Justice System Should Favor the Defendant
A final argument put forth by those opposed to nullification involves the absence
of error-correcting devices if a jury wrongly acquits a defendant. If a jury wrongly
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convicts a .defendant, there is always the possibility of a directed verdict to reverse the
conviction or the opportunity to appeal. However, when a jury engages in nullification
and hands down an acquittal that flies in the face of the evidence, double jeopardy
attaches and that defendant cannot be forced to stand trial again. To put this differently,
the defendant has avenues of recourse unavailable to the prosecution in the instance of an
unsatisfactory verdict.

Antinullification advocates maintain that the criminal justice

system is already inordinately stacked in the defendant's favor, making nullification
unnecessary and unwise.
Nullification advocates claim that the criminal justice system should be stacked in
favor of the defendant. After all, prosecutors have almost limitless resources that are
unmatched by the average criminal defendant. This seems to suggest that the prosecution
has ever opportunity to "get it right" and that there is essentially no excuse for a
prosecutor' s failure to carry his burden proof where the defendant is in fact guilty.
Further, nullification does not occur every day, making any advantage defendants may
enjoy by leaving the option to nullify open to juries is at best incremental.
As a final answer to those who rail about juries mistakenly acquitting defendants,
Scheflin and Van Dyke note that one of the hallmarks of American government is the
idea that people should be free to govern themselves within the bounds of the
Constitution (1980, 95-6).

At times, the law may become oppressive, stifling the

freedoms it was intended to protect. When this happens, juries must be free to protest
such laws by engaging in nullification. Certainly, there may be occasions were a jury,
acting in good faith, mistakenly acquits a defendant. However, freedom includes the
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liberty to make mistakes. If juries sometime err in acquitting the wrong defendants, this
must regarded simply as one of the costs of self-government.

Conclusion
Perhaps the critics are wrong. It may be that jury nullification is not such a bad
idea after all. It may be that nullification does not pose a severe threat to democracy,
does not give a minority undue power over the majority, and does not violate a
defendant's expectation of due process. In some way, nullification may even be regarded
as a necessary opportunity for equity or as an act of civil disobedience. However,
allowing for the possibility that the opponents of jury nullification have some valid
claims, a narrow definition of nullification and a limit on the circumstances under which
it is appropriate may calm the fears of some.

67

Chapter 7- Fully Informed Jury Association v. County of San Diego: Analysis and
Criticism
Introduction
Jury nullification is an important facet of the criminal justice system, but since it
is rarely publicized it is extremely likely that jurors do not know that nullification is
among the options available for their consideration. Currently only three states have
constitutional amendments requiring trial judges to inform juries of their power to nullify
the law. However, even these amendments have been given a narrow reading by the
courts. As a result, some public interest groups, like the Fully Informed Jury Association
(FIJA), attempt to educate potential jurors about the jury's nullification power. FIJA
recognizes the value of jury nullification and has attempted to inform potential jurors of
this power through a variety of means, including picketing outside of courthouses,
sponsoring a 1-800 hotline for jurors with questions about nullification, leafleting, and
distributing newsletters.
In 1996, in Fully Informed Jury Association v. County of San Diego ( 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4254 ), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California has a
compelling state interest in preventing FIJA from placing newsletters in newsstands
within 50 yards of the San Diego County Courthouse. This ruling is interesting for a
variety of reasons, not the least of which is that members of FIJA were engaged in an
activity normally protected within the purview of the First Amendment. FIJA's practices,
however, make rulings like this defensible. While the state arguably has an interest in
limiting instances of nullification, this interest cannot be characterized as compelling
where jury nullification is properly understood.
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A Brief History of the Fully Informed Jury Association
FIJA began as an outgrowth of the Montana Libertarian Party in 1979 and was
recognized as national organization in 1989.

Currently, FIJA boasts state-level

organizations in 49 states. FIJA is classified as a 501(c)3 nonprofit, which means that its
sole purposes are education and research. This nonprofit status prevents FIJA National
from engaging in any sort of lobbying efforts, which are left to the state organizations.
However, there is relatively little contact between the national organization and the state
organizations. The primary purposes of state organizations are lobbying and fundraising,
with state organizations receiving no financial support and little guidance from the
national organization.
FIJA's membership is remarkably diverse. The organization seems to attract
people from across the political spectrum, including NRA supporters as well as gun
control advocates, pro-life and pro-choice activists, those who support the legalization of
marijuana, those who want to return prayer to public schools, and those, from both the far
left and far right, who hope to overthrow the government (Haynie 1997, 344).
FIJA exists to inform jurors of their power to engage in nullification. However,
FIJA does not offer a clear definition of nullification, maintaining only that jurors are free
to be the judges of the law and the facts.

State-level organizations offer varying

explanations for the meaning of nullification, including that jurors are free to vote their
consciences or in accordance with individual notions of morality or justice. While FUA
advocates the use of nullification in both civil and criminal trials, its efforts tend to be
concentrated more on encouraging nullification in criminal court.

State-level
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organizations seek to spread the word about nullification and inform jurors of their power
through a variety of means, including protesting, picketing, holding rallies, distributing
leaflets, newsletters, and fliers, lobbying, and creating rowdy disturbances in courtrooms
during jury selection (Haynie 1997, 346-50). Additionally, FUA National sponsors a
nullification hotline (1-800-TEL-JURY) that jurors are encouraged call if they have
questions and makes available bumper stickers, t-shirts, and videotapes to the public as
well as its activists.
In the "Juror's Handbook", FUA outlines in slightly more detail its reasons for
believing that nullification is important. This position may be summarized as follows.
The jury, it seems, is actually far more powerful than the Congress, the president, or the
Supreme Court because of its ability to nullify the law. This is the primary reason
nullification is frowned upon by the government. During the course of a criminal trial,
the judge's role is not that of interpreter of the law. Instead, the judge is only the referee
and the jury acts as the source of authority on the meaning of the law. Every defendant
has a constitutional right to have his fate decided by a jury; even if the evidence of his
guilt is indisputable, an acquittal is a related expectation of this right, if acquitting said
defendant is what the jury chooses to do.
Every law is oppressive. Prosecution is synonymous with persecution. The
suggestions that nullification should be reserved for special circumstances or that
nullification is not an everyday occurrence in criminal court are both conspiracies
propagated by the government to limit instances of nullification altogether.
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Fully Informed Jury Association v. County ofSan Diego

. After San Diego required the Fully Informed Jury Association to remove its
newsstands from the sidewalk in front of the San Diego County Courthouse, FIJA
brought suit, challenging the constitutionality of General Order 102093 and General
Order 2-14-94 under 42 U.S.C §1983. When the district court denied a request for
preliminary injunctive relief, FIJA appealed. However, the organization did not fare any
better on appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the state has a
compelling interest in preventing FIJA from placing its newsletters in newsstands within
50 yards of the San Diego County Courthouse.
In an extraordinarily brief opinion, the court first addressed General Order
102093, which prohibits:
the distribution or attempted distribution of any written materials tending
to influence, interfere, or impede the lawful discharge of the duties of a
trial juror, and communication or attempt so to communicate with any
person summoned, drawn, or serving as a trial juror in these courts for
purposes of so influencing, interfering, or impeding the lawful discharge
of the duties of a trial juror in or within 50 yards of any public entrance to
the facilities within which Courts conduct jury trials within this County
(FIJA 1996, 2).
The court maintained that the state has a compelling interest in "protecting the integrity
of the jury system" and that General Order 102093 is narrowly tailored to achieve that
end. No analysis or explanation is offered that might indicate the rationale behind this
conclusion.
Turning immediately to the second regulation, General Order 2-14-94, which
requires:
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[all] vendors and distributors of newspapers distributed from newsracks
currently placed on the sidewalk bordering the front entrance of the San
Diego County Courthouse [to] remove said newsracks to another location
within two weeks (FIJA 1996, 2).
Again, absent any explanation, the court states that this is a content neutral regulation and
identifies the compelling state interest as the need to secure the area around the
courthouse. Since courts can take "supervisory and administrative actions necessary to
implement its judicial functions", this regulation too passes constitutional muster.
There are a number of problems with this decision. This ruling is interestin.g, in
part, because of the activities in which members of FIJA were not engaged. They were
not picketing outside the courthouse. They were not threatening potential jurors. They
were not mounting a rowdy protest nor were they attempting to incite a riot. They were
not acting so as to endanger passersby. Further, the FIJA activists were not causing a
disturbance inside the courthouse itself.

Rather, they were engaged in an activity

normally protected by the First Amendment.
Putting this aside, there are still other causes for concern with this ruling. The
court fails to make clear exactly how allowing FIJA to maintain its newsstand would
threaten the integrity of the jury system. Nor is it clear how removing the newsstand
from sidewalk bordering the courthouse would help improve security. Certainly, placing
a newsletter in a newsstand is much less confrontational than placing activists outside the
courthouse to approach citizens reporting for jury duty. Further, maintaining a newsstand
has to create less of a disturbance and be of less concern for law enforcement than
mounting a protest. Finally, it is uncertain how banning FIJA's newsstand helps the court
implement its "judicial functions".
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The court's reasoning does not seem to make sense.

At the root of these

discrepancies is the concern that couit held that both of these regulations survive strict
scrutiny. However, strict scrutiny requires a tight fit between ends and means. That is,
strict scrutiny requires that the state have an exceedingly valid reason for restricting some
activity and that the restriction imposed by the state be as narrowly tailored as is possible.
Such a tight fit seems to be absent here.
Further, the court calls General Order 2-14-94 a content neutral restriction.
However, the court fails to mention whether any organization besides FIJA was
maintaining newsstand outside the courthouse when this regulation was enacted. Haynie
suggests that FIJA was the only group impacted by General Order 2-14-94 (1997, 345).
If this is true, then while the restriction may be content neutral on its face, it may be
anything but neutral in application.
In order to bolster its case, the court cites three Supreme Court decisions, Burson
v. Freeman, Cox v. Louisiana, and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, as precedents.
However, each case can be distinguished from Fully Informed Jury Association v. County
of San Diego (FIJA).

In Burson v. Freeman (1992, 504 U.S. 191), the Court considers a Tennessee
statute aimed at preventing campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place. Noting that
Tennessee has a compelling interest in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud,
the Court found the statute to be an appropriate means for satisfying this interest. The
Court allows that if the state required that the restricted zone around a polling place be
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too large, then it might impermissibly burden the right to engage in political speech.
However, Tennessee's 100-foot periphery does not create such a burden.
Burson v. Freeman is a plurality, not a majority, opinion. When an opinion does

not achieve majority status, it cannot properly be viewed as setting a precedent. Putting
this aside, however, Burson can be distinguished from FIJA. Approaching potential
voters is fundamentally different from maintaining a newsstand on the sidewalk outside a
courthouse. Voters who experience harassment or intimidation upon arrival at a polling
place might choose to simply leave without voting. This would not only impact voter
turnout, but would also prevent the harassed individuals from exercising a constitutional
right. Further, intimidating potential voters could impact the outcome of given election
and might be used as a strategic measure to prevent the supporters for one's opponent
from voting. A newsstand cannot be said to have this effect. Any person entering the
courthouse who does not wish to read FUA's newsletter is free to walk by, unmolested.
Moreover, those summoned for jury duty do not have the luxury of failing to show up in
court, absent being excused by the judge. Intimidated potential jurors, unlike intimidated
potential voters, cannot simply go home.
A second case cited by the FIJA court as precedent is Cox v. Louisiana (1965, 379
U.S. 559). At issue in Cox is whether a statute barring picketing "near" a courthouse
violates the Free Speech provision of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for a majority, Justice Goldberg applies the clear
and present danger test. He concludes that states have a compelling interest in protecting
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their justice systems from undue strain that might be created by having protesters too near
courthouses.
The facts of the Cox case are not sufficient! y similar to those of FIJA to allow Cox
to serve as a precedent. There is a difference between allowing protesters near a
courthouse and permitting a newsstand to be near a courthouse. Arguably, protesters
may be confrontational and seek to bully those leaving or entering the courthouse. A
newsstand can be neither confrontational nor threatening in this way. There may be an
additional concern that permitting a protest too near a courthouse would disrupt the
court' s daily activities. However, a newsstand alone cannot create a similar type of
disturbance. Cox can be distinguished from FIJA because the activity which the Court
seeks to regulate in one is in essence different from the activity which the court seeks to
regulate in the other.
The FIJA court also cites Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989, 49 1 U.S. 781) as a
final precedent. In this case, Rock Against Racism (RAR) sponsored an annual concert
in Central Park consisting of both music and speeches calling for an end to racial
prejudice. Due to several complaints that the music was too loud, New York City
enacted a set of sound-amplification guidelines and insisted on providing a sound
technician familiar with these guidelines to work at the concert. RAR filed suit, alleging
that the guidelines were facially invalid under the First Amendment and seeking damages
and declaratory relief. The Court held that the city's guidelines were reasonable because
the intent was to regulate noise levels rather restrict speech. Further, the guidelines "left
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open other adequate channels of communication" and, thus, were not in violation of the
Constitution (Ward 1989, 802-3).
Regulating noise at a rock concert seems to fall under the purview of a public
nuisance ordinance rather than the First Amendment. The Court seems to suggest this by
noting that the city's guidelines were valid without reference to the content of the
regulated speech. The issue in FUA, however, is the regulation of political speech not the
regulation of noise levels. The presence of a newsstand outside a courthouse can hardly
be said to create a public nuisance or disturb the peace. Restricting political speech has
much greater consequences that requiring musicians to sing and play more quietly. The
two cannot be regulated as if they are one in the same.
Ward is distinguishable from FIJA on another level as well. RAR was permitted

to continue holding its concerts in Central Park, so long as it complied with the sound
amplification guidelines. FUA, however, was not permitted to maintain its newsstand in
the same location. The newsstand was relocated; the concert was not. While sound
amplification guidelines left open the same channels of communication available to RAR
before the guidelines were enacted, requiring FUA to move its newsstand denied the
organization access to the same channels of communications that were available prior to
the enactment of General Order 2-14-94.

Conclusion
While the state likely has an interest in limiting instances of nullification, this
interest cannot be characterized as compelling based on the evidence offered in Fully
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(

Infonned Jury Association v. County of San Diego.

To demonstrate a compelling

interest, the state would need, in the very least, to show that nullification is so prevalent
that it seriously undermines the integrity and effectiveness of the jury system. Further, if
General Orders 102093 and 2-14-94 are to be portrayed as narrowly tailored, the state
would also need to demonstrate that the impact of the newsletters was so substantial that
the jury pool had become infected with jurors unwilling to convict any defendant,
regardless of the persuasive quality of the evidence. In addition, the state might also need
to show that the newsletters were the primary source from which jurors were learning
about nullification. The state demonstrated none of these things in FIJA, resulting in a
ruling that is hardly defensible.
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Chapter 8- Conclusions: FUA 's· Inherent Potential

Jury nullification has a long history in the American criminal justice system. The
meaning of nullification has evolved from one that required juries to judge both the law
and the facts to the idea that juries can vote according to a collective conscience in the
interest of justice, fairness, or morality.

However, the modern understanding of

nullification is both incomplete and difficult to justify. For this reason, it may be
appropriate to suggest a set of guidelines for jurors interested in opting for nullification.
To this end, jury nullification occurs when a juror purposefully rejects the trial judge's
interpretation of the law and votes to acquit an otherwise guilty defendant because the
juror finds the law under which the defendant is charged somehow objectionable. Jurors
should be cautioned that nullification is not appropriate in every case. It is appropriate,
however, as vehicle for protest against a law or class of laws. This understanding
remains true to nullification's history since juries once nullified the law as an expression
of protest against an oppressive government. Further, this definition allows nullification
to be justifiable in terms of theories of justice and civil disobedience. Finally, defining
nullification as protest introduces the added safeguard that nullification will not be an
arbitrary choice on the part of the juror nor will it become an everyday occurrence in
courtrooms across America.
Related to offering a justifiable definition of jury nullification is suggesting some
possible ways that FDA might reform its practices. FDA has at least four problems that
prevent the public from taking its message seriously and that help justify rulings like the
one in Fully Informed Jury Association v. County of San Diego. First, FDA fails to offer
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a consistent definition of nullification. FIJA National maintains that nullification is only
the result of jurors interpreting the law for themselves. State-level organizations define
nullification in a variety of ways, ranging from the jury's "lawmaking" power, to a veto
power over government acts, to a verdict according to conscience or community
standards.

Such broad and inconsistent definitions are difficult to justify. Worse,

however, is that those opposed to nullification are free to define it as ''juror lawlessness"
in the absence of a clear consistent definition by PUA. FIJA errs in allowing its
opponents to define its cause.
Secondly, there is often a disconnect between the laws opposed by FIJA activists
and the laws at issue in trials where activists protest and encourage the jury to nullify.
Haynie notes, for example, that FIJA activists protested at the trial of some of the
members of the Branch Davidians, charged in the deaths of federal agents when the FBI
raided their compound in Waco, Texas (Haynie 1997, 351). According to FIJA activists,
they were present at the trial to protest gun-control laws. However, the Branch Davidians
were standing trial for murder not for weapons violations. That FIJA activists were
advocating acquittal, again presented their opponents with an opportunity to construe
FIJA and its efforts negatively. Following instances like this, FIJA's opponents allege
that the organization advocates lawlessness and a willingness to let murders and other
violent offenders go free.
Another problem FIJA experiences results from the failure to coordinate activities
and objectives between state-level organizations and FIJA National. Aside from lacking
a clear and consistent definition of nullification, FIJA National does not oversee or advise
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the activities of state-level organizations. This includes lobbying efforts. The result is
that state-level organizations are often aimless. Further, lobbying efforts have been
largely ineffective, due to a l.ack of experience and political savvy. FUA National cites as
one of its primary goals lobbying state legislatures to enact jury determination statutes. If
FUA were serious about this goal, it would provide some training or assistance to state
level activists attempting to lobby their state governments.
Finally, FUA makes no effort to articulate the instances in which nullification
would be both appropriate and justifiable. It cannot be true that every law is oppressive,
as FUA argues. As an organization, FUA represents an extreme and rather unpopular
point of view. In order to gain support, it needs to move toward a more moderate
position. One way to do this would be to adopt a definition of nullification advanced by
this thesis. If FUA defined nullification as an instance of protest against a particular law,
it would effectively refute several arguments made by opponents. Namely, such a
definition defies the argument that nullification lacks any sort of standard to guide jurors,
making it dangerous. Further, a more nuanced definition of nullification would allow
FIJA activists to assert that instances of nullification would be rare and, thus, unlikely to
lead to chaos or anarchy. Finally, if FUA adopted a definition similar to that advanced
here, it could couch its efforts in terms of democracy. Few would dispute that one
privilege of living under a democratic government is protest. If FUA could resolve these
problems, it should be free to publicize its message within the parameters of speech
protected by the First Amendment.
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